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Schwartz: NLRB Jurisdiction over Charter Schools

NLRB JURISDICTION OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS
DavidB. Schwartz*
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two
social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas
of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves
without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and
the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when
they arise in a concrete case. 1
INTRODUCTION

Charter schools are a fast growing-and controversial-segment of
public education in the United States. 2 The National Center for Education
Statistics (hereinafter "NCES") defines a "public charter school" as "a
publicly funded school that is typically governed by a group or organization under a legislative contract-a charter-with the state, district, or
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1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130 (2d ed. 1994).
2. Preprimary, Elementary, and Secondary Education: Public Charter School Enrollment,
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/cgb (May 2021).
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other entity." 3 Charter schools often operate as public-private hybrids. 4 On one hand, these entities utilize public funds, are authorized by
5
state statutes, and are regulated by local and state governments. On the
other hand, groups outside of the public school system often operate these
schools. 6 The central controversy surrounding charter schools is whether
they fulfill their promise to use flexibility and innovation to improve education opportunities provided to children underserved by traditional public schools-and whether their outcomes justify diverting governmental
funds from public schools to charter schools. 7 Related to this broader
controversy, some charter school supporters contend that teachers' unions
and their collective bargaining rights under public sector employment
statutes block innovation, efficiency, and improvement in the public
schools. 8
The perceived power of teachers' unions in public-sector bargaining
regimes presents the question of legal forum as a critical labor law issue
for charter schools. 9 These educational institutions often seek federal jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "NLRA"),
10
These paths are taken
and teachers unions aim for state jurisdiction.

3. Facts: Charter Schools, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30, (last visited Jan. 17, 2022). As of the 2015-2016 school year, NCES estimates that
there were approximately 6,900 charter schools teaching 2.8 million students-seven percent of all
public schools and six percent of all public school students. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION

OF EDUCATION 2018 60 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs20l8/2018144.pdf.

Currently, forty-five

states and the District of Columbia have passed charter school legislation, with Minnesota enacting
the first statute authorizing charter schools in 1991 and West virginia enacting the latest statute in
2019. 50-State Comparison: CharterSchool Policies, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES,
https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/, (last visited Jan. 17, 2022); ch. 265, art. 9, sec. 3, §
120.064, 1991 Minn. Laws; W. vA. CODE § 18-5-G (2019).
4. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supra note 2.

5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See RICHARD A. KAHLENBERG, TOUGH LIBERAL: ALBERT SHANKER AND THE BATILES
OVER SCHOOLS, UNIONS, RACE, AND DEMOCRACY 312 (2007); LEIGH DINGERSON ET AL.,
INTRODUCTION TO: KEEPING THE PROMISE? THE DEBATE OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS XII (Leigh Ding-

erson ET AL. eds, 2008).
8. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 7, at 315-16; DINGERSON ET AL., supra note 7, at XVI;
DIANE RAVITCH, SLAYING GOLIATH: THE PASSIONATE RESISTANCE TO PRIVATIZATION AND THE

FIGHT TO SAVE AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 130-33 (2020).

-

9. See DINGERSON ET AL., supra note 7, at XII; RAVITCH, supra note 8, at 132-33.
10. To be sure, the parties do not always follow this path as the public-sector employment laws
of different states vary widely as to the rights of their employees to engage in collective bargaining
if they allow public employees to do so at all. In contrast, the National Labor Relations Act provides
a uniform, national scheme encouraging and protecting the right to collective bargaining in privatesector employment.
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because employers and unions alike see a particular labor law forum as
providing substantial advantages to their position.1
With the acquiescence of local and state agencies and the state courts,
the federal National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB" or "the
Board") plays the leading role in determining whether charter schools will
fall under state or federal bargaining regimes.1 2 The Board has two primary routes in determining whether to exempt a charter school from its
jurisdiction. 13 First, it can apply the "Hawkins County" test 14 under
NLRA Section 2(2),15 which focuses on two discrete characteristics of an
employer's governance: the extent of local/state government's role in an
entity's creation and the political accountability of its administrators. 16 Second, under NLRA Section 14(c)(1), 17 the Board can assess a
wider array of factual circumstances and broad policy considerations in
determining-"in its discretion"-whether to decline jurisdiction over a
class or category of employers as not likely to create labor disputes with
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 18 The Board has opted to determine jurisdiction over charter schools using the Hawkins County/Section 2(2) approach over the discretionary/Section 14(c)(1) approach.
This Article argues that the Board's sole reliance on the Hawkins
11.

See Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PENN. ST. L.

REV. 43, 52-53 (2004).
12. See Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 9 fn.27
(2016) (noting New York Appellate Division holding cases in abeyance involving charter school jurisdiction pending the Board's determination and that no state agency sought to intervene or partici-

pate in the Board proceeding); Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at
9 fn.26 (2016) (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not intervene in proceeding or endorse school's
position in favor of state jurisdiction); Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy, 359 N.L.R.B. 455,

465 (2012) (Neither State of Illinois nor City of Chicago requested Board to cede jurisdiction).
13.

See infra text accompanying notes 55-102, 167-211.

14. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 691-692 (1967), dec. finding
unlawful refusal to bargain 170 N.L.R.B. 1409 (1968), enforcement denied 427 F.2d 312 (6th Cir.
1970), aff'd, but criticized by 402 U.S. 600 (1971); see also 21st Century Cyber Charter Sch., No. 04RC-272006, 2021 WL 3708687 (Aug. 18, 2021); Voices for Int'l Bus. & Educ., Inc., 365 N.L.R.B.
No. 66 (May 5, 2017).
15. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) ("The term 'employer'.. . shall
not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve
Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof.").

16. Amelia A. DeGory, Note, The JurisdictionalDifficulties ofDefining Charter-School Teachers Unions Under Current Labor Law, 66 DUKE L.J. 379, 384 (2016).

17. NLRA Section 14(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 519, 541-542 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)) ("The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published
rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act ... decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor disputes involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board,
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of
its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing under August 1, 1959.").

18. Id.
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County test to determine jurisdiction on a school-by-school basis is the
better approach over utilizing Section 14(c)(1) to decline jurisdiction over
the entire charter school industry. In doing so, the Board takes advantage
of the efficiency and relative ease of applying a narrow rule-based approach which is consistent with its own experience in analogous industries
concerning hybrid private-public entities. This Article will explain the
Board's choice in terms of its prior use of Sections 2(2) and 14(c)(1) in
determining jurisdiction over hybrid entities, survey its application of
these provisions to charter schools, and discuss both in terms of rulesversus-standards jurisprudence. This latter basis concerns whether a decision-making body should utilize a test with set triggers or a standard that
assesses a broader set of circumstances or factors.' 91n this context, this
Article argues that the Board's prior retreats from applying Section
14(c)(1), as well as other important policy decisions, now prevent the
Board from developing and applying a standard with which it could decline jurisdiction over the charter school industry and has steered it to20
wards applying the Hawkins County rule rather than Section 14(c)(1).
I.

CHARTER SCHOOLS AS PUBLIC-PRIVATE HYBRIDS

State charter school statutes typically permit private individuals and
entities to organize a school, obtain a charter from a state or local governmental, and then enter into a charter agreement to operate a school within
a local school district (or in some instances, such as cyber charter schools,
to operate on a state-wide basis). 2 1 The local school district provides the
charter school with the amount it spends on individual students multiplied
by the students enrolled in the charter school (known as the per capita
payment) and, in some jurisdictions, is required to provide the charter
school with rent-free space in existing public-school buildings. 22 State
and local governments oversee the charter school's performance in various ways, such as receiving annual reports, but charter school statutes exempt charter schools from many of the requirements imposed on public
schools. 23 One group of academic experts has characterized charter
schools as:

19. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58-59 (1992).
20.

See infra Section II.C.4.

21. See e.g., Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 24,
2016).
22. See id. at 3.
23. See id. at 1-2.
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[trading] greater accountability in exchange for greater autonomy ...
Accountability comes in the form of the charter, a contract that defines
the educational goals that the charter school must attain. Autonomy
comes in the form of deregulation, which frequently involves exemption
24
from state laws that govern budgets and financial transparency.

Charter schools then are a hybrid of private and public education because they are privately operated, but publicly funded and regulated. 25
Charter schools resemble public schools in that they are open to all students within a locality regardless of race, gender, ability or disability and
cannot charge tuition.2 6 They resemble private schools in that non-governmental individuals or organizations can operate them and, although
they are authorized and regulated by public authorities, they are exempt
from many of the laws and regulations governing public schools. 27 The
hybrid nature of charter schools raises complex issues under labor law,
especially as to whether their labor relations should fall under federal or
state jurisdiction. 28
If a charter school is a public entity, it would be exempt from the
Board's jurisdiction as a political sub-division under NLRA Section
2(2)29 and a union would have to resort to state public-sector labor relations law-if the relevant state permits it-to represent the school's employees in collective bargaining. 3 0 If a charter school is a private entity,
a union can seek to establish its status as the employees' collective-bargaining representative under NLRA Section 9(a), 3 1 by either requesting

24. Preston C. Green III et al., Are CharterSchools the Second Coming of Enron: An Examination of the Gatekeepers that ProtectAgainst DangerousRelated-Party Transactionsin the Charter

School Sector, 93 IND. L. J. 1121, 1131 (2018).
25. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., supranote 2.
26. See, e.g., FrequentlyAsked Questions About Public, CharterSchools, UNCOMMON SCHs.,
16, 2018)
(last visited May
http://www.uncommonschools.org/faq-what-is-charter-school
[https://perma.cc
/2PJR-FG2M]; About CharterSchools, NAT'L ALLIANCE OF PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.pubMay
16,
2018)
(last
visited
liccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/

[https://perma.cc/BRQ7-74JM].
27. Green et al., supra note 24, at 1132-33; but see infra note 262 (states also impose a multitude
of regulations on private schools).
28. N.Y.C. CHARTER SCHS. CTR., CHARTER SCHOOL LEGAL BRIEF 1-2 (2017) https://nycchar-

terschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/pub-email-legal-bulletin-january2Ol7.pdf.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
30. NLRA's Jurisdiction Over CharterSchools Remains Undecided, BARNES & THORNBURG
LLP (Feb. 24, 2020), https://btlaw.com/insights/blogs/labor-relations/2020/nlras-jurisdiction-overcharter-schools-remains-undecided.
31. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 159 (a) ("Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
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voluntary recognition from the school or by filing a representation petition
with the NLRB for an employee election. 32 In recent years, the American
Federation of Teachers and other labor unions have filed representation
petitions to the NLRB to conduct employee elections to qualify as the col33
lective-bargaining representatives of the employees of charter schools.
Conversely, charter schools employees or the schools themselves have
filed decertification or "RM" petitions, respectively, with NLRB regional
offices to nullify union certifications as public-sector bargaining representatives and to bring their workplaces under NLRB jurisdiction-only
to be opposed by unions seeking to retain their public-sector status under
state regulation. 34 As will be discussed below, the NLRA requires the
Board to determine not only whether a charter school qualifies as an eligible employer under the NLRA, but also provides the Board with the
discretionary authority to determine whether asserting jurisdiction over

of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment .... ").
32. NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL 11002.2 (2020). The Board designates representation pe-

titions as either "RC", "RM", or "RD" petitions. See id. In a RC petition, an employee, group of
employees, or a labor organization asks the Board to determine the status of the filing party as the
bargaining agent in a described bargaining unit. See id. In a RM petition, an employer alleges that it
has received one or more claims for recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent or that the continued
majority status of the incumbent union is in question. See id. In a RD petition, an employee, group of
employees, or a labor organization asserts that the certified or currently recognized bargaining agent
is no longer the bargaining representative. See id.

33. See, e.g., Baxter Acad. for Tech. and Sci., No. 01-RC-239165, 2020 WL 1931422 (Mar. 30,
2020); see also New Foundations Charter Sch., No. 04-RC-199928, 2018 WL 329945 (Jan. 31,2018);
see also Better Choice Found. d/b/a Mary D. Coghill Charter Sch., No. 15-RC-197643, 2017
WL3616483 (Aug. 22, 2017); see also Advocs. for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., d/b/a Lusher Charter
Sch., No. 15-RC-174745, 2017 WL 971632 (Jan. 31, 2017); Voices for Int'l. Bus. and Educ., Inc.,
d/b/a Int'l. High Sch. of New Orleans, 365 NLRB No. 66 (Feb. 1, 2017), enforced, 905 F.3d 770 (5th
Cir.2018); Farmworker Inst. of Educ. and Leadership Dev., No. 31-RC-164338, 2016 WL 6609502
(Nov. 7, 2016); see also Agora Cyber Charter Sch., No. 04-RC-170767, 2016 WL 6821477 (Nov. 16,
2016); Agora Cyber Charter Sch., No. 04-RC-179402, 2016 WL 6821478 (Nov.16 2016); Pa. Cyber
Charter Sch., No. 06-RC-159861, 2016 WL 6124486 (Oct. 19, 2016); Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 364
N.L.R.B. No. 87 (2016).
34. See, e.g., Kipp Academy Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4,
2019); see also Evergreen Charter Sch., No. 29-RD-175250 (Oct. 27, 2016); Riverhead Charter Sch.,
No. 29-RD-132061, 2016 WL 6069608 (Oct. 7, 2016); Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn,
364 NLRB No. 88, slip op. at 5. (Aug. 24, 2016). Presumably, parties maneuver to obtain the regulatory forum that it believes to be most advantageous, depending on the particular state's legal and
political attitudes toward public-sector unionism. Commentators have accused charter schools, their
supporters, and associated entities of "opportunistic lawyering" in sometimes emphasizing their public nature in seeking governmental funding while, at other times, emphasizing their private characteristics in order to evade statutory requirements applied to public entities. See Preston C. Green III et
al., Having It Both Ways: How CharterSchools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the

Autonomy of PrivateSchools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303, 336 (2013).
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charter schools as an industry advances the NLRA's statutory objectives.3 5
II.

NLRB METHODS OF DETERMINING PRIVATE/PUBLIC
STATUS FOR JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES

A. Statutory Provisions and Rules vs. Standards
The NLRA provides the Board with two complementary approaches
to determine whether or not to assert jurisdiction over employers with
both private-sector and public-sector characteristics. 36 First, the Board
must determine whether the entity qualifies as an "employer" under Section 2(2) of the Act or is exempt as a political subdivision. 37 To make this
determination, the Board applies its long-established "Hawkins County
test" 38 to determine the public or private status of an employer under Section 2(2).39 Second, if the Board determines that an entity is a statutory
employer and not a political subdivision, it can invoke its discretionary
authority under Section 14(c)(1) of the Act and decline jurisdiction over
the entire industry to which the entity belongs (its "class or category")
based on a broader assessment of the place of charter schools in the
NLRA's national scheme regulating labor relations. 40
This Article will discuss these two approaches to determining jurisdiction in terms of the jurisprudential dichotomy between the "rule" versus "standard" approaches in making legal determinations. 4 1 Establishing

35. Hyde Leadership, slip op. at 1.
36. See discussion infra Section II.B.; discussion infra Section II.C.2. regarding the Board's
overall approaches to determining whether to assert jurisdiction over a particular employer.

37. See Hyde Leadership,slip op. at 4.
38. Id. at 5.
39. See id at 3.
40. See id.
41. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
625, 655 (2002) ("we can consider a standard to be an open-ended decision making yardstick and a
rule, its counterpart, to be a harder-edged decision making tool."); Cass Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1023 (1995) ("the choice between rules and rulelessness might be well
be based on a highly pragmatic, contextualized inquiry into the costs of the two approaches in the
area at hand."); Sullivan, supra note 19, at 57 ("These [legal] forms can be classified as either 'rules'
or 'standards' to signify where they fall on the continuum of discretion."); Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988) ("the blurring of clear and distinct
property rules with the muddy doctrines of 'maybe or maybe not"'); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Stand-

ards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382 (1985) ("The trigger [in a rule or standard, respectively] can be
either empirical or evaluative and the response can be either determined or guided."); H.L.A. Hart,
supra note 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

7

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

140

[Vol. 39:1

a "rule"-a concise test-binds the decisionmaker "to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts." 42 In contrast, a
"standard" approach-the use of a group of factors or considerations to
assess the broader circumstances of a situation-"tends to collapse decision making back into the direct application of the background principle
or policy to a fact situation." 43 For example, the government can regulate
the speed of highway traffic by establishing a rule-"do not go over 60
miles per hour"-or a standard-"do not drive unreasonably fast."44 The
former sets sixty miles per hour as the triggering fact for the rule violation,
and the latter requires the decisionmaker to decide what set of circumstances (road conditions, traffic flow, or weather/visibility) indicates
whether the motorist's speed was unreasonably fast.4 5 Among the advantages of rules are simplicity of application and consistency in enforcement; the advantages of standards include the ability to weigh multiple
factors to capture the totality of a situation.4 6 While rules and standards
operate as poles of legal decision-making, in actual practice, they often
"mark a continuum, not a divide . .. and [that] [a]ll kinds of hybrid combinations are possible."4 7 For example, a rule can incorporate evaluative
aspects into its trigger or triggers and, conversely, a standard can utilize
48
triggers into its consideration of multiple factors or circumstances. Perhaps most importantly in the context of NLRB caselaw, a standard that
repeatedly comes to the same result can "crystalize" over time into a
rule. 49
The Board's use of the Hawkins County test in determining whether
an entity is a political subdivision under NLRA Section 2(2) is a "rule"
because it focuses on two attributes-"public creation" and "political control"-as possible "triggers" in determining whether an entity should be
50
exempt as a political subdivision from the Board's jurisdiction. In contrast, Section 14(c)(1) provides a "standard" permitting the Board to assert
or decline jurisdiction based on broader considerations regarding the relationship of a class of employers to national labor relations policy.5 1 But,
42.

Sullivan, supra note 19, at 58.

43. Id.
44. Sunstein, supranote 41, at 959.
45. See generally Sullivan, supra note 19, at 58-59 (describing standards as giving the decisionmaker more discretion than rules do).

46. Id. at 65-66.
47. Id. at 61.
48. Id. at 61-62.
49. Id. at 62. ("A rule may be understood as simply the crystalline precipitate of prior fluid
balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way.")

50. See NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 427 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1970).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1).
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the NLRA's statutory language ultimately provides only a starting point
for the Board's application, or in J.C. Gray's paradox that "statutes are
sources of law, not part of the law itself." 52 The Board's actual determination of jurisdiction in prior cases has created its own law ofjurisdiction,
which in turn, binds it in relation to charter schools. 53 This Article will
discuss the Board's use of NLRA Sections 2(2) and 14(c)(1) in determining jurisdiction over the full range of entities operating in relation to governmental regulation and oversight, then survey its application of these
provisions to charter schools, and finally discuss both in terms of rulesversus-standards jurisprudence. 54
B. NLRA Section 2(2)-the PoliticalSubdivision Exemption
The NLRA does not provide a definition of "political subdivision
thereof' in Section 2(2) nor does its legislative history provide any insights as to Congress' intent regarding the parameters of this term. 55 Since
1968, the Board has instead applied its own test-set out in Hawkins
County-finding that an entity qualifies as a political subdivision under
Section 2(2) if it is either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute
a governmental department or an administrative arm ("state creation") or
(2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or
the general electorate ("political accountability"). 56 In making this determination, the Board will consider state-law pronouncements regarding an
entity's public status, but does not find them to be controlling. 57 In NLRB
v. National Gas Utility ofHawkins County, 58 the Supreme Court approved
the Board's test, but not its application to the eponymous utility company
("the Utility") created under a 1937 state law that permitted Tennessee
residents to form utility districts to provide services to the public, such as
sewers, water, police and fire protection, and natural gas distribution. 59

52. HART, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
119 (1902)).
53. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 691 (1967).
54. See infra, Section IB.
55. M. Edward Taylor, Note, The PoliticalSubdivisionExemption of the NationalLabor Relations Act and the Board'sDiscretionaryAct, 1982 DUKE L.J. 733, 733-34 (1982).

56. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 167 N.L.R.B. at 691-92.
57. Id. at 691.
58. NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. 600, 602 (1971).
59. See id.
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The Court's decision, as briefly synopsized below, illustrates the parameters of the federal-state issues raised in determining NLRB jurisdiction
over mixed public-private entities. 60
In 1967, Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 102 filed a petition with
the NLRB region to represent the Utility's pipefitters, won the subsequent
Board election, and was certified by the Board as the pipefitters' bargaining representative.61 The Utility refused to bargain with the union, contending that the Board could not assert jurisdiction because it was a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee and thus did not qualify as an
employer under Section 2(2) of the NLRA. 62 After the Board found that
63
the Utility had violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain, it sought review of the Board's bargaining order in the Sixth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals. 64 The circuit court declined to enforce the
Board's order, finding that the Board should respect Tennessee law, as set
out in a decision of the state supreme court, classifying utilities under the
1937 statute as part of the state government. 65 After granting certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court approved the Board's test, deferring to
the Board's construction of the term "political subdivision" within the
NLRA, and rejecting the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court that found utility districts to be an operation of
state government. 66 Instead, the United States Supreme Court held that
federal law controls public-subdivision status, based on the Congressional
intent that the NLRA should "solve a national problem on a national
scale" and rejecting its limitation "by ... varying local conceptions, either
statutory or judicial." 6 7 The Court nonetheless went on to reject the
68
Board's application of the second prong of its test. The Court found that
the Utility was not administered by individuals who are responsible to
political officials or the general electorate, based on the authority of an
elected county judge to appoint the Utility's administrators and the fact
that they can be removed for malfeasance or nonfeasance under Tennessee's General Ouster Law. 69 The Court also noted other circumstances

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 604.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 602.
NLRB v. The Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 427 F.2d 312, 312 (6th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 313.
Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. at 602-03.
Id. at 603-04 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944)).
Id. at 602-03.
Id. at 607.
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indicating political subdivision status and its "public status" such as eminent domain authority, "necessary and requisite" powers, and its exemption from federal income tax and social security. 70 Justice Stewart dissented, stating that the Board was entitled to weigh the various factors and
come to its own conclusion in construing Section 2(2).71
In the fifty years since the Supreme Court approved the Hawkins
County test, the Board has applied the test to determine the political subdivision status of a wide variety of employers, including art museums, 72
public television stations, 73 public libraries, 74 state universities (and affiliated entities), 75 zoos, 76 state bar associations,77 community action agencies, 78 and hospitals. 79 The Article will briefly discuss the Board's practice in applying the two prongs of the Hawkins County test as
foreshadowing later issues arising in its application to charter schools. 80
1.

Hawkins County First Prong: State Creation as an
Administrative Division

Under the first prong of the Hawkins County test, the party claiming
an employer to be an exempt political subdivision must demonstrate that
the state created the entity as a governmental division or administrative
arm. 8 1 The Board has found such status when the state has directly created
the entity, funded it, and exercised close oversight and control over its
operations. 82 The Board's most extensive discussion of the Hawkins
70. Id. at 608.
71. Id. at 609-10.
72. Detroit Inst. of Arts, 271 N.L.R.B. 285, 286 (1984); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, 194
N.L.R.B. 371, 372 (1971).
73. Sw. Tex. Pub. Broad. Council, 227 N.L.R.B. 1560, 1562 (1977).
74. Rosenberg Libr. Ass'n, 269 N.L.R.B. 1173 (1984); Jervis Pub. Libr. Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B.
1386, 1388 (1982).
75. Rsch. Found. of City Univ. of N.Y., 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 968 (2002); Univ. of Vt., 297
N.L.R.B. 291, 294-95 (1989).
76. Okla. Zoological Tr., 325 N.L.R.B. 171, 171 (1997).
77. State Bar of N.M., 346 N.L.R.B. 674, 674 (2006).
78. Albany Cnty. Opportunity, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 886, 887 (1990); Woodbury Cnty. Cmty.
Action Agency, 299 N.L.R.B. 554, 555-56 (1990).
79. E.g., Truman Med. Ctr., 239 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1067 (1978); Bishop Randal Hosp., 217
N.L.R.B. 1129, 1131 (1974).
80. See infra Sections II.B.1., II.B.2.
81. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 691-92.
82. State Bar of N.M., 346 N.L.R.B. at 679; see Ass'n for the Developmentally Disabled, 231
N.L.R.B. 784, 784 (1977) (disability service provider exempt based on creation under Ohio statute;
services limited to state residents; state funding; state ownership of facilities; state performance of
accounting, payroll, and purchasing functions; and the state board could deny approval of the actions

of the non-profit's director); Madison Cnty. Mental Health Ctr., 253 N.L.R.B. 258, 258-59 (1980)
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County's first prong occurred in State Bar of New Mexico, where the
Board analyzed its requirements vis-a-vis the circumstances of the creation of the New Mexico bar association. 83 The Board found that because
the state supreme court created the association (acting pursuant to a 1978
state statute), the bar association "exists pursuant to State action and owes
its entire existence to the will of the State of New Mexico" and thus met
the state creation requirement of the first prong. 84 The Board further
found that the bar met the administrative-subdivision requirement because: it was created "to assist the judicial branch . . . in regulating the
legal profession"; it "fulfills regulatory functions on behalf' of the court;
the court "controls the governing structure of the State Bar"; the court
"exercises substantial control over the State Bar's priorities and opera85
tions"; and the court "exercises significant control over [its] budget."
Despite its close analysis of the state statute, the Board found, as required
by the Hawkins County decision, that federal law (and not its designation
in the New Mexico state statute) determined the bar association to be a
political subdivision. 86 The Board also found that the bar association "exists to fulfill a State purpose"-the regulation of the legal profession to
protect the public. 87
In contrast, the Board has found employers not to be exempt under
the first prong where the state clearly did not create them-even if they
otherwise resembled arms of local government. 88 In Research Foundation of CUNY,89 the Board found that twelve private incorporators created
the employer as a not-for-profit educational corporation under New York
statute to administer contracts and grants awarded to the City University
of New York (hereinafter "CUNY"). 9 0 The Board noted that while the
Research Foundation provided services to CUNY, it operated separately
through an independent board of directors and its managers who exerted
(mental health center exempt based on creation by county mental health board; public funding; county
approval of budget and ownership of main facility; county contracting of employer's administrative
and fiscal services; and county guidelines governed its labor relations); Hinds Cnty. Hum. Res.

Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. 1404, 1404 (2000) (state statute authorization of a county board to establish
and operate the agency; state control of funding and agency's by-laws).

83.
84.
85.
86.

See State Bar ofN.M, 346 N.L.R.B. at 676-78.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 679. The Board also relied on federal judicial decisions treating so-called "integrated"

bar association as "state agents" for the purpose of sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 679 n.13 (collected cases finding integrated State bar associations to be immune from
suit in federal court as arms of the State).

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 678.
Rsch. Found. of the City Univ. of N.Y., 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 971 (2002).
Id. at 965.
Id.
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"direct and independent control over its employees, management, labor
relations, budget, and daily operations." 9 1 No special legislative act or
action by a public official was required to create the employer. 92 Although the employer's purpose benefitted a public university, there was no
indication that the state intended it to operate under the control of the university.93 The Board further opined that the "plain language" of Section
2(2) did not exempt private entities acting as government contractors. 94
The Board concluded that: "[t]he creation of the [e]mployer by private
individuals as a private corporation, without any state enabling action or
intent, clearly leaves the Employer outside the ambit of the Section 2(2)
exemption." 9 5 In the absence of a fmding that it was created by the state,
the Board will not exempt an entity from its jurisdiction as a public subdivision even where the entity is clearly performing public functions. 96
2.

Hawkins County Second Prong: Political Accountability

Under the second prong of the Hawkins test, the party claiming that
an entity is an exempt employer from the NLRA has the burden of establishing that the employer's policy-making officials have "direct personal
accountability" to public officials or the general public. 97 The Board will
find such accountability where public officials can either appoint or remove a majority of the governing board of the entity. 98 Though determining whether political appointees constitute a majority of the directors or
trustees of an entity would seem to be a simple proposition, the Board
often has to assess the circumstances surrounding an entity's operations
to determine this status. 99 For example, in Cape Girardeau Care Center,
the Board found the county government's approval of a list of director
nominees submitted by a nursing home's owner to be "purely ministerial"
because it was not based on any legal authority (or circumstances indicating that the county government controlled the employer), but was simply

91. Id at 968.
92. Id. at 969.
93. Id. at 968.
94. Id.
95. Id (citations omitted). The Board also found thatthe Research Foundation was not exempt
under the second prong of the Hawkins County test. Id. at 969-70.

96. See id at 968.
97. Cape Girardeau Care Ctr., Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1019 (1986).
98. Rsch. Found. of City Univ. of N. Y., 337 N.L.R.B. at 969; Univ. of Vt., 297 N.L.R.B. 291,
294 (1989).
99. See Univ. of Vt., 297 N.L.R.B. at 294-95.
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100
In conpart of the employer's efforts to obtain tax-exempt financing.
accountatrast, in Oklahoma Zoological Trust, the Board found political
bility based on the mayor of Oklahoma City appointing trustees from a
list of nominees submitted by the Zoological Society, a private group, as
well as other circumstances such as the zoo's public funding and statutory
requirements that the trustees take an official oath of public office and
seek public approval for the use of tax revenues. 10 1 Chairman Gould dissented, contending that the Zoo's private trust agreement rather than a
public statute established the appointment procedures and that the mayor
at most exercised only a limited veto power; he also noted the absence of
an "unfettered" removal power. 102

3.

Application to Charter Schools

Despite the Board's long experience in applying the Hawkins County
test to a wide variety of entities, the Board's efforts in applying the test to
charter schools initially misfired on procedural grounds. 103 Nonetheless,
in Chicago Mathematics,104 a non-precedential decision, the Board set
out an approach to applying the Hawkins County test to charter schools,
100. Cape GirardeauCare Ctr., Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. at 1019-20.
101. Okla. Zoological Tr., 325 N.L.R.B. 171, 172 (1997).
102.

Id. at 173-74. Subsequently, in the Research Foundation case, discussed above, the Board

found no public accountability despite the presence of public officials on the entity's board of directors. The Board observed that these officials did not constitute a majority on the board, but also that
the entity's by-laws rather than public statute had placed these officials on the board, thus echoing
Chairman Gould's contention in Oklahoma Zoological Trust. Rsch. Found. of City Univ. of N.Y., 337

N.L.R.B. at 969-70.
103. In Charter School AdministrationServices, Inc., a Board consisting of only two members
applied the Hawkins County test and asserted jurisdiction over a non-profit corporation engaged in
managing charter schools located in several states. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B.

394, 394 n.I, 397-99 (2008). A subsequent decision by the Supreme Court invalidated the basis of
all NLRB two-member decisions and effectively rendered them non-precedential. New Process Steel,

LP v. N.L.R.B., 560 U.S. 674, 674 (2010). The Board subsequently referred to the CharterSchool
&

decision as "[a] nonprecedential, but soundly reasoned, decision" which it would draw upon in its
decision in Chicago Mathematics and Science Academy Charter School, Inc. Chi. Mathematics

Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 462 (2012). Unfortunately, the Board's decision in
Chicago Mathematicsfoundered on procedural grounds as well when in Noel Canning v. NLRB., 573
U.S. 513 (2014), the Supreme Court found that President Obama had unlawfully placed three nominees without Senate confirmation despite the Senate being in pro forma session. Id. at 556-57. Because two of the unlawfully appointed members made up part of the Chicago Mathematics majority
opinion, that decision was also rendered non-precedential. In Pennsylvania Cyber CharterSchool, a
properly-constituted Board applied Hawkins County-with frequent citation to Chicago Mathematics-to find that a Pennsylvania charter school was not an exempt political subdivision. See Pa. Cyber

Charter Sch., No. 6-RC-120811, 2014 WL 1390806, at *2 (Apr. 9, 2014). The Board chose not to
publish this decision, thus also reducing its value as precedent. See generally id.

104.

Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. at 461-62.
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ultimately followed four years later in Hyde Leadership'05 and Pennsylvania Virtual.106 It found that a private non-profit corporation that established and operated a public charter school was not exempt under either
prong of the Hawkins County test. 107
Regarding the first prong, the Board held that the school was created
by private individuals and not by a governmental entity, special legislative
act, or public officials. 108 The Board characterized the Illinois Charter
Schools Act as only providing the "framework" or "roadmap" for the
school's creation and operation and that the "independent initiative of private individuals" brought the charter school into existence. 109 Regarding
the second prong, whether an entity is administered by individuals who
are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate, the Board
found that private individuals (and not public officials) could appoint or
remove a majority of the school's governing board and therefore the charter school was not a political subdivision.1 1 0
Only in 2016, did the Board establish firm precedent, in two cases
issued on the same day, regarding the application of the Hawkins County
test to charter schools. 1 1 In Pennsylvania Virtual, the Board applied the
test to a cyber charter school that remotely taught students throughout
Pennsylvania using computers.11 2 Regarding the first prong of Hawkins
County, the Board found that a group of individuals created the school
under the Pennsylvania Charter School Law, when they: organized and
filed an application for a charter with the Norristown, Pennsylvania school
district; filed for non-profit corporate status with the Pennsylvania Department of State; and formulated and instituted governance and operating
procedures for its school. 1 3 The Board rejected the employer's assertion
105. Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. 1, 3 n.7, 5-7
(2016).
106. Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1, 3, 6, 8 (2016).
107. Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. at 455.
108. Id. at 460-61.
109. Id. at 461.
110. See id. at 462-63. Member Hayes concurred with the Board majority's application of the
Hawkins County test but would have exercised the Board's discretion to decline jurisdiction under

Section 14(c)(1). Id. at 466, 468.
111. See, e.g., Pa. Virtual CharterSch., No. 87, slip op. at 1, 5, 7; Hyde Leadership Charter Sch.
- Brooklyn, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 1, 5, 6 (2016).
112. Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., slip op. at 1, 2, 13. While the charter school at issue in Pennsylvania Virtual was a cyber charter school that teaches students remotely using computers; the Board
has applied the same principles to all charter schools. Id. at 5, 7. For example, in New Foundations
CharterSchool, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a "bricks-and-mortar" charter school located in
Pennsylvania and created under the same charter school law. New Foundations Charter School, No.

04-RC-199928, 2018 WL 329945, review denied (Jan. 31, 2018).
113. Pa. Virtual CharterSch., slip op. at 2, 3, 6, 13.
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that the Pennsylvania state government created the school by granting it a
charter or that the government's role in funding and contracting with the
school exempted it from the Board's jurisdiction.' 14 The Board noted that
it "routinely asserts jurisdiction" over employers performing governmental services under contract.1 1 5 Regarding the second prong of Hawkins
County, the Board found that the "relevant inquiry" was whether public
officials possessed the authority to appoint or remove a majority of the
individuals administering the entity under state law or whether the em116
The
ployer's own governing documents authorized these actions.
docgoverning
Board found that Pennsylvania Virtual's own bylaws and
uments controlled the appointment and removal of the school's board
members without the involvement of any local or state government officials.11 7 The Board found it unnecessary to consider additional factors
(such as the Pennsylvania charter school law's designation of the trustees
as public officials or the state's oversight and regulation of the school)
because they could not qualify the school as a political subdivision where
there was no public involvement in the appointment or removal of the

school's administrators.

18

Building on Pennsylvania Virtual, the Board in Hyde Leadership asserted jurisdiction over a New York charter school created under that
state's Charter School Act enacted in 1998.119 Regarding the first Hawkins County prong, the Board found that private individuals took the initiative in creating the school by preparing and filing an application with
the New York Department of Education that included detailed information about the proposed school and then putting into effect documents
concerning its governance and operations. 120 The Board found that the
action of New York State Board of Regents in granting the school a charter did not constitute a governmental act of creation nor that the conduct

114. Id. at 7.
115. See id. at 5-6. Since the Board found that the state had not created the school, it found it
unnecessary to address the other element of the first prong: whether the school qualified as a governmental departmentor administrative arm. Id. at 6. Nonetheless, the Board found that the school would
not meet this qualification either, finding that the school's relationship with the state government was
"akin" to that of a contractor. Id.

116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Pa. Virtual CharterSch., slip op. at 8-9.
119. See Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 9 (2016)
(discussing NY Educ. Law Ch. 16, Title II, Article 56, §2850).
120. Id. at 5.
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of governmental entities in funding or contracting with it otherwise exempted the school from the Board's jurisdiction. 121 Regarding the second
Hawkins County prong, the Board found that the school was not administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or the general
electorate because the school's founder selected the members of its initial
board (which was only then approved by the Board of Regents) and the
sitting board had the power to appoint new trustees to fill vacancies or to
remove current trustees using processes set out in its by-laws.1 22 The
Board found that the Regents' authority under New York law to remove
charter school trustees for malfeasance law did not constitute "direct personal accountability" because it applies to all New York educational institutions, both public and private. 12 3
Member Miscimarra dissented, stating that he would fmd that the
charter school met both prongs of Hawkins County.1 24 Regarding the first
prong, Member Miscimarra pointed to New York state law as empowering the Board of Regents to bring a charter school into existence by both
approving the school's charter application and incorporating it as an education corporation.1 2 5 In addition, he relied on other circumstances to indicate that state law recognizes charter schools to be "public" schools,
such as the Charter School Act characterizing charter schools as political
divisions of the state, and the public school system providing almost all
of the school's funding.1 26 Regarding the second prong, political accountability, Member Miscimarra relied on the authority of the Board of Regents to approve a charter school's initial board of trustees and to remove
a trustee for certain misdeeds as well as the school's charter agreement
authorizing the New York City School Chancellor to name replacement
members to the school's board. 127

121. See id., slip op. at 5. The New York State Board of Regents is the umbrella body of the
University of the State of New York which consists of all public and private schools in New York,
various museums and archives, and public broadcasting stations. See About the University ofthe State
of New York (USNY), N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, http://www.nysed.gov/about/about-usny (last visited
Oct. 20, 2021). USNY is not a teaching institution, but acts as the licensing and accrediting entity for
educational services in the State of New York. University of the State of New York, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_the_State_of_New_York (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Hyde Leadership,slip. op. at 6-7.
Id., slip op. at 7.
Id., slip op. at 9 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).
Id., slip op. at 11.
Id., slip op. at 12 n.35.
Id., slip op. at 13.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

17

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4

150

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:1

In the three years since the Board asserted jurisdiction over the charter schools in Hyde Leadership and Pennsylvania Virtual, the Board denied review in eleven representation cases involving charter schools. 12 8
Each time, the Board majority found that the charter school at issue was
not an exempt political subdivision under Section 2(2); former Member
Miscimarra, in turn, referenced his corresponding dissents in several
cases. 129 In doing so, the Board demonstrated its willingness to apply its
interpretation of the test to a variety of different forms of charters created
and operated under different state charter school laws, finding both the
governance of the schools and the state statutes to be sufficiently similar
130
to their counterparts in Hyde Leadership and Pennsylvania Virtual.
The Board also denied review over a trio of cases involving charter
schools located in New Orleans, where after Hurricane Katrina devastated
the city in 2005, the State of Louisiana utilized existing laws to convert
ninety percent of the city's public schools into charter schools.1 3 ' Despite
Louisiana's public policy in favor of transforming public schools into
charters, the Board denied review of the regional directors' decisions,

128. See, e.g., Advocs. for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., Case 15-RC-174745, 2017 WL 971632 (Feb.
1, 2017); Riverhead Charter Sch., Case 29-RD-132061, 2016 WL 6069608 (Oct. 7, 2016); Evergreen
Charter Sch., Case 29-RD-175250, 2016 WL 6354580, (Oct. 27, 2016); Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., Case
06-RC-159861, 2016 WL 6124486 (Oct. 19, 2016); Agora Cyber Charter Sch., Case 04-RC-170767,
2016 WL 6821477 (Nov. 16, 2016); Agora Cyber Charter Sch., Case 04-RC-179402, 2016 WL
6821478 (Nov. 16,2016); Farmworker Inst. of Educ. and Leadership Dev., Inc., Case 31-RC-164338,
2016 WL 6609502 (Nov. 7, 2016); Better Choice Found., Case 15-RC-197643, 2017 WL 3616483
(Aug. 22, 2017); New Founds. Charter Sch., Case 04-RC-199928, 2018 WL 329945, (Jan. 31, 2018);
voices for Int'l Bus. & Educ., Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op. at 1 (May 5, 2017);
Baxter Acad. for Tech. & Sci., No. 01-RC-239165, 2020 WL 1931422 (Mar. 30, 2020).
129. E.g., Advocs. for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., 2017 WL 971632. The Board also rejected invoking Section 14(c)(1) in many of these cases and declined to use its discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction. Id. In an unfair labor practice case, the Board found a Texas charter school to be

exempt. LTTS Charter Sch., Inc., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 38, slip op. at 1 n.l (Mar. 15, 2018). Shortly
thereafter, in another unfair labor practice case, the Board asserted jurisdiction over an Arizona charter

school. Excalibur Charter Sch., Inc., 366 N.L.R.B No. 49, slip op. at 1 (Mar. 29, 2018).
130. See Riverhead CharterSch., 2016 WL 6069608, at n.i; Evergreen CharterSch., 2016 WL
6354580, at n.i; Pa. Cyber CharterSch., 2016 WL 6124486, n.l; Agora Cyber CharterSch. I, 2016
WL 6821477, at n.1; Agora Cyber Charter Sch. II, 2016 WL 6821478, at n.1; 21st Century Charter
School, No. 04-RC-272006, 2021 WL 3708687, n.I (Aug. 18. 2021). In FarmworkersInst. ofEduc.
and Leadership Dev., Inc., the Board found that the circumstances of a California charter school's
creation and governance differed only in minor ways from the schools in the two lead cases. Farmworker Inst. of Educ. and LeadershipDev., Inc., 2016 WL 6609502, at n.1.
131. Advocs.for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., slip op. at n.1 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (noting the predominance of charter schools in the New Orleans public school system); Voices for Int'l

Bus. and Educ., Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op. at 1 n.2 (May 5, 2017); Better Choice Found., 15RC-197643, 2017 WL 3616483 (Aug. 22, 2017).
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based on similarities in the schools' governance and state statutes with
Hyde Leadership and Pennsylvania Virtual.13 2
One of the Louisiana cases occasioned the single instance (so far) of
federal appellate review of the Board's application of the Hawkins County
test to charter schools. In Voices for InternationalBusiness and Education, Inc. v. NLRB, the Fifth Circuit upheld both prongs of the Hawkins
County test as consistent with the common meaning of "political subdivision" insofar as "ultimate authority over policy-making remains with the
public." 133 The court emphasized that the public did not select the directors who set policy for the school because the charter school's board of
directors was self-perpetuating. 134 The court approvingly characterized
the Board's approach as elevating "public creation" and "public control"
to be the "predominant consideration[s]" in indicating whether there is
public or private control of policymaking.1 35 Although charter schools
are part of the public school system (noting that in post-Katrina New Orleans, charters constitute ninety percent of all the public schools), the
court found that they are not politically accountable to the state and thus
the state lacks political influence over them. 13 6 This situation reflects a
legislative choice in Louisiana's charter school statute. 137 "Private control was not a bug of that law; it was a reason for it." 13 8 In the absence of
political accountability over policymaking, the court found the charter
school was not a political subdivision under Section 2(2) of the NLRA. 139
The only time the Board found a charter school to be an exempt public subdivision occurred in an unfair-labor practice case rather than in a

132.

Advocs. for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., slip op. at n.1; Better Choice Found., at n.1.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Voices for Int'l. Bus. & Educ., Inc., 905 F.3d at 773-74.
Id. at 774.
See id. at 776.
See id. at 772, 777-78.
Id. at 778.
Id.

139. See id. The concurring member of the circuit panel agreed with the result, but later criticized
the Board for asking the court to defer to the Board's interpretation of the NLRA under the Chevron
doctrine rather than relying on congressional direction to find such "unambiguously private entities"
to be subject to collective bargaining. See id. at 778-81 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (Ho, J. concurring)). Contrary to the concurrence,
the court majority relied less on deference to the Board's application of the Hawkins County test (and
its interpretation of Section 2(2)) and more on its own view of the role of political accountability in
defining the private versus public status of an employer under Section 2(2). See id. at 773-74, 778.
Deferring to the Board's interpretation of Section 2(2) under the Chevron doctrine would seem to
make sense in this situation because, as discussed earlier, Congress did not supply any legislative
direction as to what constitutes a "political subdivision" in passing Section 2(2), apparently seeing it
as self-evident. See TAYLOR, supranote 55, at 733-34.
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representation case. In LTTS CharterSchool, Inc. d/b/a UniversalAcademy, the Board affirmed an administrative law judge's finding that a
Texas charter school was exempt from the Board's jurisdiction. 140 The
Board agreed with the judge that the Texas Commission of Education, a
public agency, could, under certain conditions, reconstitute the school's
governing body by its authority to appoint new members or retain incumbent members. 14 1 Further, the Board found that the Texas Education Code
specifically granted the Commission of Education this authority as to
charter schools under particular conditions-in contrast, the removal authority at issue in Hyde Leadership provided the New York Board of Regents only with the authority to remove board members for malfeasance
42
from any educational corporation created under the Regents' authority.'
Accordingly, the Board found that the school to be exempt under the second prong of the Hawkins County test. 143
4.

The Hawkins County test as a rule

In terms of rules versus standards jurisprudence, the Board is clearly
interpreting Section 2(2)-and the Hawkins County test-as a rule-based
approach to determining jurisdiction. Indeed, the Board in Pennsylvania
Virtual 44 and Hyde Leadership14 5 has considerably tightened its application of the Hawkins County test, moving away from its use of evaluative
criteria in its earlier use of the test. For example, in State Bar of New
Mexico, the Board took account of the attorney bar association's public
purpose in regulating the legal profession in determining the relationship
between the state and the bar association. 146 In Cape GirardeauCare
Center, the Board evaluated the circumstances regarding the county government's authority to approve the care center's directors to determine
whether it was ministerial in character.1 47 In the charter school context,
however, the Board has limited itself to examining only the processes of
creation and appointment or removal of governing board members and
moving away from assessing the purpose-as advocated in Member
140. LTTS Charter Sch. Inc., 366 N.L.R.B. No. 38, slip op. at 1 n.1 (Mar. 15, 2018).
141. Id.
142. Id. The New York Board of Regents' authority to grant the status of "educational corporation" extends to both public and private entities. See Id.
143. Id. at 3.
144. See Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1, 5 (2016).
145. See Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 5-6 (Aug.
24, 2016).
146. State Bar of N.M., 346 N.L.R.B. No. 64, slip op. at 676-78 (2006).
147. Cape Girardeau Care Ctr., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 143, slip op. at 1018-20 (1986).
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Miscimarra's dissents-behind the state's relationship with the charter
schools at issue. 14 8 As noted earlier, rules and standards can exist on a
continuum, with evaluative aspects playing a role in a rule despite its natural role in the operation of a standard. 14 9 Further, as noted earlier, standards that produce the same result upon iteration often "crystalize" into
rules.15 0
The Board's decision to apply a "rule" approach when assessing
whether to assert jurisdiction over individual charter schools was not inevitable. By way of contrast, by examining the broader circumstances of
the charter school's relationship with state entities, the federal courts have
essentially opted to apply a "standard" approach when trying to determine
whether a charter school is a state actor for Section 1983151 civil action,
or any other constitutional litigation. In GreaterHeights Academy v. Zelman, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of a Section
1983 lawsuit by two Ohio charter schools that alleged three Ohio government officials had denied them due process when they withheld "per pupil" payments from the schools without a hearing.15 2 The court found
charter schools to be "part and parcel" of Ohio's public education system
and therefore these schools could not accuse the state officials of depriving them of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution 153 (including due process of law). 154 In doing so, the
court relied on such circumstances as: the Ohio statute and the Ohio Supreme Court's designating charter schools as political subdivisions; state
control over their creation, student testing requirements, and health and
safety standards; state approval of school sponsors to oversee the schools;
state funding through taxation; and the legal requirement that charter
schools must be open to all residents, non-sectarian, and non-discriminatory.1 55
In Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit affirned the federal district court's decision dismissing a former
148.

See, e.g., Hyde Leadership, slip op. at 12 n.32 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (noting

that the school was incorporated for educational purposes); Pa. Virtual CharterSch., slip op. at 13
n.13 (Miscimarra, P., dissenting) (noting that the purpose here was to provide K-12 education.)
149. Sullivan, supranote 19, at 61.

150. Id at 62.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of civil rights).
152. Greater Heights Academy v. Zelman, 522 F.3d 678, 681 (2008).
153. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. XIv, § 1 ("[Nor] shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.").

154. GreaterHeightsAcad, 522 F.3d 678 at 680 (citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
182, 186-87 (1923), describing a state as supreme "[w]ith respect to its political subdivisions.").
155. Id. at 680-81; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2744.01(F), 4117.01(B) (West 2016); State ex rel.
Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1165 (2006).
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teacher's Section 1983 complaint. 156 The complaint had alleged that the
charter school acted under color of state law when it allegedly violated his
constitutional rights (i.e. liberty, due process, and freedom to associate)
15 7
The
by declining to renew the teacher's contract without a hearing.
Ninth Circuit found an insufficiently close nexus between the state and
the charter school's conduct toward its former teacher, but unlike the Sixth
Circuit in GreaterHeights Academy, it focused on whether the charter
school's role as an employer constituted state action, rather than examin158
ing the broader relationship between the state and the charter school.
The court found insufficient evidence that the state was involved in the
employment actions at issue or that any of its "substantive standards or
procedural guidelines ... 'compelled or influenced"' the employment actions undertaken by private parties. 15 9 The court also found that statutory
and administrative characterization of charter schools as "public educational services" was not dispositive. 160 The court therefore agreed with
the lower court that the discharged teacher had not demonstrated that the
charter school was a state actor and therefore the school had no obligation
to provide him with due process (i.e., notice or hearing) before acting
against him. 161
The contrast with the federal courts' approach illustrates that, on a
jurisprudential level, the Board has opted for a "rule" approach to determining political subdivision status based on relatively narrow characteristics as opposed to a "standard" approach weighing broader characteristics. Unlike the GreaterHeights Academy decision, in which the Sixth
Circuit assessed the broader circumstances regarding the charter schools'
relationship with the state, the Board's application of the Hawkins County
test does not consider the manifold circumstances connecting charter
schools to the state and local governments, such as education policy, finance, and regulation.1 62 In the Caviness decision, while the Ninth Circuit
did not take in the wide range of circumstances utilized in GreaterHeights
Academy, it still examined a broader set of circumstances than the Haw-

156. Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 818 (2010).
157. Id.
158. Caviness, 590 F.3d at 812, 814, 816, 818; Greater Heights Acad, 522 F.3d 678 at 680.
159. Caviness, 590 F.3d at 818. The court also noted that the Arizona charter school statute exempts charter schools from statutes and rules governing public school governing board and school
districts, including those regulating the employment rights of teachers. Id. at 817 (citing ARIz. REV.

STAT. § 15-183(E)(5)).
160. Id. at 814.
161. Id. at 818.
162. See id. at 809-10; Greater Heights Acad, 522 F.3d 678 at 679, 681.
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kins County test in determining state involvement with the adverse employment action at issue. 163 The Board's application of the Hawkins
County "rule" rather than the "standard" utilized by the federal courts can
be explained by the narrower connotation of the NLRA Section 2(2)'s use
of the term "political subdivision" (indicative of entities placed within a
governmental structure) versus the broader ambit of "state actor" for Section 1983 purposes (implying the inclusion of private entities that could
be only acting on behalf of the state). 64 It could also be presumed that a
judicial court of general jurisdiction will naturally feel empowered to decide legal questions on a broader basis than an administrative agency, such
as the NLRB, created by statute to determine a narrower body of law. 165
As will be seen in this Article's next Part, Section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA
permits the Board-in theory-to consider these broader circumstances
in determining whether to decline jurisdiction over an entire class of employers, but the Board-for reasons of past practice and precedent-has
declined to do so regarding charter schools.1 66
C. NLRA Section 14(c)(1)
1. Legislative Background
The NLRA provides the Board with jurisdiction over all enterprises
whose impact on interstate commerce is more than de minimis,167 but, as
a matter of administrative policy in order to conserve its resources, the
Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction over employers which it considers as having an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. 168 The Board
most often uses its published jurisdictional standards to determine
whether to assert or decline jurisdiction over employers otherwise within
its statutory jurisdiction. 169 Depending on the category of the relevant
enterprise, the jurisdictional standards provide that the Board will assert
jurisdiction over an employer based on its purchase or sale of set monetary
levels of goods and services coming into or going out of the employer's
home state (known as "inflow" and "outflow") and/or gross volume of
163.

Compare Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806 at 814-15, 817, with

GreaterHeightsAcad., 522 F.3d 678 at 679-81.
164. See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806 at 812; 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Advocs. for Arts-Based Educ. Corp., 15-RC-174745, 2017 WL 971632 at n.1 (Feb. 1, 2017).
165. See generally NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. 600, 603-05 (1971).
166. See infra Sections I.C.i., I.C2.
167. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1939).
168. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 83-84 (1958).
169. Id.
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business or revenues. 170 Apart from its published standards, Section
14(c)(1) of the NLRA authorizes the Board to exercise its discretion to
decline jurisdiction over entire industries, that is, "over any labor dispute
involving any class or category of employers" that it deems as having an
insufficiently substantial effect on interstate commerce. 171
Congress enacted Section 14(c)(1) and (2) in 1959 as part of the La172
In
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).
the
so-called
to
resolve
sought
Congress
and
(2),
14(c)(1)
Section
passing
"no-man's land" problem caused by the interaction of the Supreme
Court's expansion of federal preemption of state labor regulation and the
Board's introduction of monetary standards in which it declined jurisdiction over smaller employers.1 73 In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,
the Supreme Court held that the NLRA "preempt[ed] the field" regarding
its provisions and thus prevented state courts or state administrative agencies from dealing with potential violations under state labor relations law
or state regulations even where the NLRB had declined jurisdiction under
its jurisdictional standards. 174 This situation created a "no-man's land"
170. Id. at 84. In its first years of existence, the Board declined jurisdiction exclusively on a caseby-case basis, but in 1950, it first introduced published jurisdictional standards setting the parameters
for an enterprises' impact on interstate commerce, which it has subsequently updated. Id. at 83 n.7;
OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., NAT'L LAB. REL.'S BD.: AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
REPRESENTATION CASES § 1-201, at 2 (2017).

171.

29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1).

The Board can also assert its non-statutory authority to decline
&

jurisdiction over individual employers in a particular case when it decides "that the policies of the Act
would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case." NLRB v. Denver Bldg.

Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951); e.g., Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1352 (2015)
(explaining that the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over football players/students at a private
university because they participated in a collegiate sports division that included both public and pri-

vate universities); see also Temple Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1972) (explaining that the Board
declined to assert jurisdiction over a university based on "its unique relationship" with the state of
Pennsylvania which transformed the ostensibly private university into a quasi-public institution).

172.

§ 164(c)(1). The accompanying language in Section 164(c)(2) states: "Nothing in this Act

[subchapter] shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory
(including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and
asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of

this subsection, to assert jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2).
The primary purpose of the LMRDA, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, was to protect the interests of union members by imposing various reporting requirements on unions and to
promote union democracy by providing standards for union officer elections and union trusteeships.

H.R. Rep. No. 741, at 5 (1959). It also amended the NLRA, most relevantly to this Article by addressing the no-man's land problem discussed above, but also by clarifying the Taft-Hartley provisions concerning secondary coercion. Id
173. See id at 17-8; Bernard Meltzer, JurisdictionOver Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 6,
55-60 (1959) (discussing preemption issue and "no man's land" problem prior to the enactment of

Section 14(c)(1)-(2)).
174. Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel.'s Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10 (1956). At the time of the Guss opinion, Congress had already enacted Sec. 10(a) as part of the Taft-Hartley amendments that permitted the NLRB
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where certain employers (and their employees) were denied a federal forum for the resolution of labor disputes because their effect on commerce
was too small, but they were also unable to turn to the States for alternative relief because the NLRA nonetheless "occupied the field" and
preempted state labor law.1 75 Congress feared that the Board's published
jurisdictional standards would also deprive smaller employers of the protections enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act while the preemption doctrine
would deprive them of analogous state labor law protections.1 76 To untie
this knot, Congress enacted Section 14(c)(1) as part of LMRDA to permit
the Board to decline jurisdiction on an industry-wide basis (i.e., classes or
categories of employers) and Section 14(c)(2) to empower state agencies
to assert jurisdiction over the disputes excluded from Board adjudication.177
In defining the parameters of the Board's authority to decline jurisdiction, Congress used the phrases "in its discretion" and "in the opinion
of the Board." 178 These phrases extend the Board's authority to determine
the effect of an industry on commerce beyond merely applying a set monetary value to "[enacting] policy decisions about how best to effectuate
the purposes of the national labor laws, decisions informed by its special
to enter into cession agreements with state labor agencies to cede jurisdiction over labor disputes
except where the section of the state labor statute is "inconsistent" with the "corresponding provision"

of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C.

§

160(a) ("Provided, that the Board is empowered by agreement with

any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominately
local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the
provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such
agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act [subchapter] or has received a
construction inconsistent therewith.").
In Guss, the Court identified cessation agreements as the exclusive means that would permit
states to act concerning matters entrusted to the Board. Guss, 353 U.S. at 9. In actuality, the NLRB
has never entered into a cession agreement with any state agency, but has always found the relevant
state labor statute to lack sufficient correspondence to the NLRA. See in re State of Minnesota, 219

N.L.R.B. 1095, 1096 (1975) (state statute prohibited strikes and lockouts and provided for binding
arbitration); Kaiser-FrazerParts Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1052 (1948) (state statute did not include
anti-communist provisions comparable to those then-contained in Sec. 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act).
See OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., NAT'L LAB. REL.'S BD.: AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
REPRESENTATION CASES, at 2 (2017) ("Board authority to cede jurisdiction") (Board plurality notes
that "[prior Board] decisions have effectively rendered the proviso a nullity." citing Produce Magic,

Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1172 (1995)).
175.

Guss, 353 U.S. at 4, 10-11. See generally John H. Fanning, The No-Man's Land and the

National Labor Relations Board's JurisdictionalPolicies, 8 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
176. See id. at 4. In reality, the Board has not adjusted its jurisdictional standards to keep pace
with inflation. Id. Accordingly, these standards exclude very few employers from the Board's jurisdiction based on the size of their revenues. Id.

177. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1970).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)-(2).
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knowledge and expertise." 179 The Second Circuit described the statutory
language as indicating a congressional intent that the Board exercise "very
broad discretion" that "would ordinarily be unreviewable."1 80 The statutory allocation of broad discretion to the Board to determine jurisdiction
81
In
on a policy illustrates a "standard" approach to decision making.1
addition, the text of Section 14(c)(1) specifically provides that the Board
can decline to assert jurisdiction either by administrative rulemaking or
case decision. 182
2. Application Generally
Almost immediately after the passage of Section 14(c)(1) in 1959,
the Board began utilizing it to decline jurisdiction over entire industries,
but also often reversing itself to assert jurisdiction over the industries at
issue. In Flatbush General Hospital, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over for-profit private hospitals, finding them to be "local in character" because they mostly served area residents and state governments
closely regulated them in order to protect the health and safety of state
residents.' 8 3 Only seven years later, in Butte Medical Properties, the
Board reversed its decision to decline jurisdiction and asserted jurisdiction
over for-profit hospitals.1 84 Despite the heavy state regulation of hospital
construction and patient care, the Board asserted jurisdiction based on the
immense and national scope of this industry; the impact of their aggregate
purchases on interstate commerce; the interstate travels of health care dollars to-and-from consumers, national insurance companies, and the recently enacted federal Medicare program; and the existence of only minimal state regulation of hospital labor relations.1 85 In Ming Quong
Children'sCenter, the Board also initially declined jurisdiction over non-

179. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 708 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
914 (1983).
180. Id. at 52-53.
181. See HART, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing statutory delegations to administrative agencies
as requiring "that the rule-making authority must exercise a discretion, and there is no possibility of
treating the question raised by the various cases as if there were only one uniquely correct answer to
be found.").

182.
183.

29 U.S.C. §164(c)(1).
Flatbush Gen. Hosp., 126 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-146 (1960). At that time, the Board only as-

serted jurisdiction over private hospitals if they were located in the District of Columbia, vitally affected national defense, or were an integral part of a larger establishment that met the Board's jurisdictional standards. Id. at 145.

184.
185.

Butte Med. Props., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967).
Id. at 267-68.
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profit childcare facilities, 186 and then reversed itself two years later in St.
Aloysius Home, stating that it would assert jurisdiction over these facilities
based on their impact on commerce without reference either to their nonprofit status or charitable purpose. 187
Of more direct relevance to charter schools, the Board initially declined to assert jurisdiction over providers of childcare programs or
schools associated with public education and then reversed itself. In
PennsylvaniaLaborRelations Board, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over daycare centers that provided minority children of preschool
age with programs to increase their preparedness for entering public elementary schools. 188 The Board found that these programs were "essentially local in character" because the employer's activities were centered
on the local public school system and that any labor dispute associated
with the employer would not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 189 Later that year, the Board followed this line of reasoning in two
cases (issued on the same day) in which it declined to assert jurisdiction
over two state-funded private schools serving children with disabilities
based on their "special relationship to the public school system."1 90 The
schools provided state-mandated educational services to these children
which the state could not supply in its public school facilities.1 9 1 The
Pennsylvania Department of Education approved and authorized tuition
payments to the private schools and set standards regarding such matters
as class size, curriculum, staff certification of the professional staff, and
materials/ equipment/supplies. 192 The state also regularly evaluated the

186. Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. 125, 901 (1974).
187. St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1344-45 (1976). In concurring, Member Fanning
reiterated his view that the Board had wrongly decided Ming Quong because the Board had already
forsworn relying on a class of employers' non-profit status in several earlier cases when they otherwise had a substantial effect on interstate commerce and that the 1974 amendments only highlighted

this basic error. Id. at 1346, n.9 (citing Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1047 (1970) and
Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970)). In dissent, Chairman Murphy and Member Penello
argued that the Board could act under its discretionary authority under Section 14(c)(1) to decline
jurisdiction in harmony with Congress' positive "attitude" towards charitable, non-profit, and noncommercial enterprises, as illustrated by the legislative history of both the 1947 Taft-Hartley and the
1974 healthcare amendments. See id. at 1346-48.

188.
189.
190.
N.L.R.B.
191.
192.

Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., 209 N.L.R.B. 33 (1974) (advisory opinion).
Id.
Overbrook Sch. for the Blind, 213 N.L.R.B. 511, 511-12 (1974); Pa. Sch. for the Deaf, 213
513, 513-14 (1974).
OverbrookSch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 512; Pa. Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 514.
OverbrookSch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 511; Pa. Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 513.
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schools' compliance with these standards and neither school accepted pri193
vate payment of tuition nor participated in any commercial enterprises.
The Board found that, though private in form, "the thrust of [each
school's] educational activities is to supplement the school facilities and
educational program of the public school system." 194 The Board concluded that the Pennsylvania Department of Education exercised "substantial and direct control" over these private schools' operations; that the
schools' activities were "essentially local;" and did not substantially impact interstate commerce; therefore, the Board exercised its discretion under 14(c)(1) to decline jurisdiction.1 95
Only a few years later in D. T. Watson Home for Crippled Children,
the Board reversed its policy regarding private schools providing special
education services. 19 6 While acknowledging that the employer's relationship with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania resembled that described
in Overbrook and Pennsylvania School,197 the Board held that, pursuant
to its recent decision in National Transportation Service Inc., it would no
longer decline jurisdiction based on its assessment of the purposes of the
services provided by an employer to the exempt entity (in this case, the
state government).' 98 Further, the Board in National Transportation Service Inc. stated that "nothing in the legislative history of this provision
indicates any congressional intent that the Board decline to assert jurisdiction over any employer solely because of the relationship between ser99
vices it provides to an exempt entity and the purposes of such entity."1
Instead, the Board would assert jurisdiction where the particular employer
met the Section 2(2) definition of "employer" and possessed sufficient

193. Overbrook Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 511-12; Pa. Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 513-14. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had authorized the creation of both schools in the 19' century and had provided financial assistance to them, beyond paying tuition for standards. Overbrook Sch., 213

N.L.R.B. at 511; Pa.
194. Overbrook
195. Overbrook
Sch. for Exceptional

Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 513.
Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 512; Pa. Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 514.
Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 512; Pa. Sch., 213 N.L.R.B. at 514; see also Laurel Haven
Child., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1198-99 (1977). The Board cited both Over-

brook School and Pennsylvania School in their decision to decline jurisdiction over a Missouri school

for children with developmental issues (albeit without citing Section 14(c)(1)). Id. at 1198-99.
196. D.T. Watson Home for Crippled Child., 242 N.L.R.B. 1368, 1370 (1979). The employer
provided healthcare and education services to children with physical and mental disabilities in a facility located in Leetsdale, Pennsylvania. Id

197. D. T. Watson Home, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1369 n.7-8, 1370 (first citing Overbrook School, 213
N.L.R.B. at 511; then citing Pennsylvania School, 213 N.L.R.B. at 513) (finding that unlike the employers in Overbrook School and Pennsylvania School, the D.T. Watson School accepted private tuition payments from non-state approved students.).

198. D.T. Watson Home, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1370 (citing Nat'l Transp. Serv., Inc., 728, 240
N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1979)).
199. Nat'l Transp. Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. at 565.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/4

28

Schwartz: NLRB Jurisdiction over Charter Schools

2021 ]

NLRB JURISDICTIONOVER CHARTER SCHOOLS

161

control over the employment conditions of its employees to enable it to
bargain with the union. 200 The Board found that, insofar as they were
inconsistent with this rationale, the Overbrook and the Pennsylvania
School cases were no longer controlling. 20 1 The Board found that, despite
the state's oversight and financial role in the home's operations, the employer retained sufficient control over the employment conditions of its
employees and therefore asserted jurisdiction over the employer. 202
The most prominent-and longest lasting-incident where the Board
has invoked Section 14(c)(1) to decline jurisdiction occurred via administrative rulemaking in 1973 when the Board declined to assert jurisdiction
over the horse-racing and dog-racing industries. 20 3 In its rulemaking, the
Board relied on three characteristics of these industries as justifying declining jurisdiction over them. 204 First, the states exerted extensive state
control over racetrack operations, that included employee licensing and
policing the sport's integrity. 205 Second, both horse-racing and dog-racing's pattern of short-term employment (high percentage of temporary
employees, high turnover, short workhours, and brief or sporadic employment) indicated that the two industries exerted only a minimal impact on
interstate commerce and that the Board would probably encounter administrative problems in applying the NLRA to these short-term employees. 206 Third, the actual occurrence of only a few labor disputes in these
industries supported the Board's earlier finding that the impact of labor
disputes on these industries would be insubstantial. 20 7 The Board declined jurisdiction based on both a close relationship to and regulation by
local government and because Board jurisdiction would "not substantially
contribute to stability in labor relations." 208 Despite subsequent criticism
200.

D. T. Watson Home, 242 N.L.R.B at 1370 (citing National Transportation,240 N.L.R.B. at

565). Several years later, in Management Training Corp., the Board abandoned the control test altogether and stated that it would assert jurisdiction if the employer qualified under Sec. 2(2) of the Act
and would assume that the parties themselves could determine if effective bargaining was feasible.

Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1358 (1995); see NLRB v. Young Women's Christian
Ass'n of Metro. St. Louis, 192 F.3d 1111, 1116-19 (8th Cir. 1999) (delineating and approving the
Board's change in course).

201. D. T. Watson Home, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1370.
202. Id.
203. Declination of Assertion of Jurisdiction 38 Fed. Reg. 9537, 9537 (Apr. 17, 1973) (the racing
rule). The Board had earlier declined jurisdiction over these industries in a series of cases dating back

to 1950.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 9537 n.5, (citing L.A. Turf Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 20 (1950) and subsequent cases).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

208. Id. Chairman Fanning did not join in the Board's conclusion to decline to assert jurisdiction
over the horse-racing and dog-racing industries, relying on his earlier dissent in Centennial Turf Club,
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of this rulemaking from several Board members, the Board has never
overruled this rule. 20 9 Nonetheless, the Board has rejected Section
14(c)(1) declination in cases involving similar industries when it found
that labor disputes in the industries at issue were likely to substantially
impact interstate commerce 2 10 and that extensive state regulation and
211
close oversight could coexist with the Board's assertion of jurisdiction.
3. Application to Charter Schools
As with its initial application of the Hawkins County test to charter
schools, the Board first declined to apply Section 14(c)(1) to the charter

Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 698, 699 (1971), in which he decried the majority's reliance on state regulation of
the industries in light of the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over employees in the gaming industry
despite similarly intensive state regulation. Id. (citing El Dorado Club, 151 N.L.R.B. 579 (1965)).
He also noted the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over other industries in which it had previously
declined jurisdiction, such as private hospitals and nursing homes, non-profit colleges/universities,
and professional baseball. Id. (internal citations omitted).

209. Am. Totalisator Co., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 314, 314-15 (1979). In Elliot Burch, the NLRB
issued an advisory opinion regarding a petition to represent racetrack employees pending before the
New York State Labor Relations Board in which the NLRB stated that it would continue to decline

jurisdiction. Elliot Burch, 230 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1161-62 (1977). In concurring on procedural grounds,
Chairman Fanning noted his continued disagreement with the Board's rule, pointing to the enormous
monetary and interstate impact of horseracing involving tens of million attendees at racetracks, hundreds of millions in revenues, and billions in pari-mutual betting as well its resulting impact on other
industries in commerce, such as the food service companies supplying racetrack concessions. Id at

1162. He quipped "how many hot dogs do 43,147,257 people eat?" Id at 1163 n.6. He also pointed
out the recent rise in labor disputes in horseracing itself, despite its regulation by the states. Id. at
1162. Subsequently, several Board members expressed interest in reversing the Racing Rule, but the
Board has never done so. Am. TotalisatorCo., 243 N.L.R.B. at 314-15 (Members Fanning and Trues-

dale dissenting); Del. Racing Ass'n, 325 N.L.R.B. 156, 156 (1997) (Chairman Gould, concurring).
Although the Racing Rule remains in effect, the Board now asserts jurisdiction over racetracks that
no longer operate primarily as racetracks because they have added gambling casinos to their facilities.

Yonkers Racing Corp., 355 N.L.R.B. 225, 227 (2010).
210. See, e.g., Am. League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 190 (1969) (scope of the
operations of a professional baseball league and its member teams are clearly national in scope and
ought not be subject to diverse state laws; future labor disputes likely to be national in scope beyond
individual state boundaries).

211. Volusia Jai Ala, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280, 1282 (1975). The State of Florida regulated the
jai alia industry through its Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering which ensured the frontons' compliance with state regulation through on-site oversight by state employees permanently employed at the
fronton. Id. Florida also directly regulated many aspects of the frontons' operations included licensing
employees, annually approving the continued employment of some of the managers, and directly intervening in labor disputes (including providing a right of appeal of discharges and suspensions as
well as engaging in strike resolution efforts). Id. The state also directly shared in the proceeds from
the frontons' gambling operations. Id. at 1280-82. In asserting jurisdiction, the Board also noted the
relevance of its prior assertion of jurisdiction over state-regulated gambling casinos. Id. (citing El

Dorado Club, 151 N.L.R.B. 579 (1965)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol39/iss1/4

30

Schwartz: NLRB Jurisdiction over Charter Schools

2021 ]

NLRB JURISDICTIONOVER CHARTER SCHOOLS

163

school industry in a non-precedential decision, Chicago Mathematics.212
The Board majority relied on the resemblance of the charter school at issue to a government contractor that retained control over most of its employment matters, but still remained subject to "exacting oversight" by
governmental bodies through statutes, regulations, and agreements. 2 13
The majority viewed the Chicago School Board as exerting only limited
control over the charter school and noted that the charter agreement itself
recognized the school's retention of a private appointment power over its
governing board. 2 14 As for the Racing Rule, the majority found that the
rulemaking did not establish a general standard for the Board to exercise
its discretion to decline jurisdiction. 215 Instead, the Board majority relied
on the particular circumstances of the racetracks' operations, especially
their use of short-term employment as tending to both minimize their impact on commerce and to hinder the Board's ability to oversee the tracks'
labor relations. 2 16 The majority stated that it "should act with great care"
when depriving employees of the benefits of the Act, even where private
entities perform "important public work subject to extensive government
control." 2 17 Finally, the majority pointed out that neither the State of Illinois nor any local agency had sought to enter into a cession agreement
with the Board for it to cede its jurisdiction to a state agency under Section
10(a) of the Act.2 18
In his dissent, Member Hayes responded that the Board should decline jurisdiction under Section 14(c)(1) because charter schools resembled the horse- and dog-racing industries based on: its integrated and
highly-regulated relationship with the state government and the local
212. Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 455 (2012). In an earlier case, Charter
School Administration Services, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 394 (2008), the two-member Board (Chairman
Schaumber and Member Liebman) similarly found that a company that managed charter schools located in several states was not an exempt public subdivision under the Hawkins County test. The
Board did not directly discuss declining jurisdiction but rejected the Regional Director's statement
that asserting jurisdiction over the employer "would create policy and legal issues unique to education
involving State legislation and outside the Board's expertise and mission." Id. at 399 n.21 (internal
quotations omitted). This case is non-precedential because it was issued by a two-member Board. Id.

at 455.
213. Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad, 359 N.L.R.B. at 464 ("In many, if not most, respects, this
charter school case is not much different from other Board cases involving government contractors.
Many government contractors are subject to exacting oversight in the form of statutes, regulations,
and agreements. Yet the Board routinely asserts jurisdiction over private entities that provide services, under contract, to governmental bodies.").

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. (citing Firstline Transportation Security, 347 N.L.R.B. 447 (2006)) (discussing private

security screeners at airports).

218. Id. at 465-66.
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school district and the school's fundamentally local nature. 2 19 Member
Hayes pointed to several characteristics of the charter school-government
relationship as indicating an "entwinement" and a " special relationship"
with state and local government comparable to that found in Temple University.22 0 These characteristics include the state having authorized the
creation of charter schools to serve as an integral part of the public school
system; its extensive regulation of their operations (including its labor relations and financing); and its classification of charter school as public
schools and its employees as public employees (including imposing on
2 21
them some of the same legal requirements applied to the public sector).
As with the Hawkins County test, the Board first discussed Section
14(c)(1) in the charter school context in a precedential decision in Pennsylvania Virtual.222 In asserting jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania cyber
charter school at issue, the Board majority 223 rejected invoking Section
14(c)(1) in order to decline jurisdiction over the school.2 24 They found
that cyber charter schools exerted a substantial effect on commerce, noting that the Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School-one of thirteen cyber
charter schools in Pennsylvania-taught 3,000 students with an operations budget in the millions of dollars. 225 The majority also found that the
state did not mandate the establishment of charter schools, but merely permitted others to create them as an alternative to state schools. 2 26 They
also rejected the proposition that because K-12 education is local in nature, any labor disputes involving charter schools would have only localized effects based on the schools' "unique and special relationship" with
state governments. 227 The majority demurred from analogizing charter
schools with the Board's declination of jurisdiction over the horse and
dog-racing industries, finding the latter to be a response to the unique na-

219. Id., (first citing Seattle Real Estate Board, 130 N.L.R.B. 608 (1961); then citing United
States Book Exchange, 167 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1967); and then citing Evans & Kuntz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B.
1216 (1971) (citing to similar cases where the Board declined jurisdiction in regards to real estate,
book exchanges, and small law firms respectively).

220. Id. at 467
221. Id.
222. See Pa. virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 9 (2016).
223. Id. at 1 (3-2 decision) (consisting of Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran).

224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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ture of those industries and the states' interest in maintaining their integrity.228 The majority instead found that state and local regulatory oversight of charter schools to be more "akin" to the "exacting oversight" imposed by governments over their contractors and that this kind of
oversight does not prevent the Board from routinely asserting jurisdiction
over government contractors. 22 9
In dissent, Member Miscimarra relied on two clusters of policy rationales as supporting declining jurisdiction under Section 14(c)(1). 230
First, charter schools as a "class or category" have an insubstantial effect
on commerce because state and local issues predominate in issues relating
to their "creation, structure and operation" and, as with the horseracing
and dog-racing industries, "they are peculiarly related to, and regulated
by, local governments." 2 31 He also argued that the charter schools are
local in nature because they are an "integral component of the K-12 system of public education, in that they are tuition-free, open to all children,
are funded on a per-student basis, and state/local authorities regulate and
oversee them." 2 32 Member Miscimarra would find that the state and local
nature of charter operations indicated that labor disputes will have a
largely localized effect, assisted by state laws that often serve to minimize
the disruptive effect of labor disputes by limiting public school teachers'
right to strike. 23 3 Member Miscimarra brushed aside charter schools' status as government contractors, arguing that the Board's decision in Management Training to overrule the "right to control" test made regulatory
oversight a non-issue. 234 Second, Member Miscimarra argued that the
fact-specific requirements of the Hawkins County test required the Board
to painstakingly examine the facts and state laws relevant to each charter
school and thus created considerable uncertainty regarding whether they
should be regulated under the NLRA or state law. 235 In his view, the
Board should avoid the delay and uncertainty of applying the Hawkins

228. Id. at 9-10.
229. See id. at 10.
230.

See id at 11 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).

231. See id. at 11, 13 (citing Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 388, 391 (1959); 38 Fed.
Reg. 9537, 9537.)
232. See id. at 13.
233. See id. at 14 (pointing out that 14(c)(1) declinations should be based not just on "dollar
volume of business in interstate commerce," but whether state regulation reduces labor disputes to an

"insignificant" effect on commerce (citing the New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1983))).
234. See id at 15 (citing Management Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995)).
235. See id. at 12, 15.
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County test over multiple charter schools over years of litigation and instead permit state governments to align the labor relations of charter
2 36
school employees with those of public sector employees.
Subsequent to its decision in Pennsylvania Virtual, the Board has
declined to invoke Section 14(c)(1) and has instead asserted jurisdiction
over charter schools under the Hawkins County test.237 In Kipp Academy
Charter School, several employees of a charter school located in New
York City filed a decertification petition against a union certified as the
employees' bargaining representative under New York State's labor relations statute governing public sector employees. 238 After the NLRB's Regional Director asserted jurisdiction over the school under Section 2(2) of
the Act, the Board initially granted the union's request for review in order
to consider whether to change its position and invoke Section 14(c)(1) in
239
After
order to decline jurisdiction over charter schools as an industry.
the
and
schools
charter
several
(including
curiae
and
amici
parties
the
exercise
not
to
AFL-CIO) filed briefs on review, the Board "determined
its discretion to decline jurisdiction over charter schools as a class under
Section 14(c)(1) at this time" and affirmed the Regional Director's assertion of jurisdiction without any substantive discussion. 24 0
4. 14(c)(1) as a Standard - Foreclosed by the Board's Prior
Policy Path
Dissenting Board members and the Kipp Academy litigants (both
parties and amici curiae)have provided the raw materials for constructing
a standard for declining jurisdiction under Section 14(c)(1) over charter
24 1
First, that
schools as "a class or category" consisting of four rationales.
242
Secgovernments.
charter schools are "entwined" with state and local

236. See id. at 18 (reiterating his Pennsylvania Virtual dissent regarding Section 14(c)(1), arguing that the Board should decline jurisdiction in order to provide the largely local charter school industry with stability and certainty under state public sector jurisdiction). But see Hyde Leadership

Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 623 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 8 (Aug. 24, 2016) (issuing on the same day,
the same Board majority declined to apply Section 14(c)(1) to a New York charter school and relied
on the same reasoning as in Pennsylvania Virtual).

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2020 WL 1550566 (Mar. 25, 2020).
See Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
See id.
See Kipp Acad. CharterSch., 2020 WL 1550556, at 1.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2019).
See Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 467 (2012) (Hayes, Member, dis-

senting).
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ond, that charter schools possess a "special relationship" with these entities. 2 43 Third, that the K-12 education provided in charter schools is a
"essentially local in nature " and unlikely to create labor disputes affecting
interstate commerce. 244 Fourth, and finally, that the Board's inconsistent
application of the Hawkins County test to charter schools undercuts the
NLRA's goal of imposing "labor stability" through "a single, uniform,
national rule." 245 By relying on these factors, the Board could, in theory,
follow the federal courts' approach in the Zelman case of consulting a
broad range of circumstances in determining the nexus between state and
local government and charter schools and develop a standard to assess
whether the "whole situation" justifies declining jurisdiction over charter
schools. 24 6
For better or worse, the Board is forestalled from using a standard to
determine jurisdiction over charter schools by policy decisions set out in
its prior precedents. First, Board decisions that require asserting jurisdiction over all government contractors who qualify as employers under Section 2(2) indicate that charter schools' contractual relationship with state
and local governments does not sufficiently entwine the schools with
them. 24 7 Second, contradicting the supposed special relationships between local/state governments and charter schools, Board precedent has
long asserted jurisdiction over private educational entities operating as adjuncts to public school systems. 248 Third, the considerable interstate character of some charter operations as well as their funding by the federal
government indicates that charter schools' status as K-12 educational entities does not make them local in nature or localize their impact on interstate commerce. 24 9 Fourth, the NLRA's central purpose of establishing a
uniform national labor policy contradicts the proposition that the Board
will promote labor stability in the charter school industry by declining jurisdiction over them. 250
The Racing Rule and the Temple University decision are most often
cited as supporting the entwinement of charter schools with state and local
243.
244.

See id at 464.
Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 13-14 (Miscimarra, Member,

dissenting).

245.
246.

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959).
Sunstein, supra note 41, 999-1000.

247.

See infra text accompanying notes 268-273.

248.

See Laurel Haven Sch. for Exceptional Child., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1198 (1977).

249.

See infra text accompanying notes 280-285.

250.

See Loc. 926, Int'l. Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681

(1983) ("Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court,
to decide. This implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor policy.") (emphasis in original).
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251
But the
government as justifying the Board declining jurisdiction.
Board has found that neither precedent are apposite to the charter school
industry because of the more attenuated relationship between charter
schools and state and local governments in comparison to that between
the state governments and the horse and dog racing industries and the uni2 53
and
versity at issue in those precedents. 252 In Pennsylvania Virtual
2 54
Hyde Leadership, the Board majority stated the Racing Rule has not
served as a template for declining to assert jurisdiction in any other industries involving heavy state regulation. Indeed, the Board has consistently
declined to extend the underlying reasoning of the Racing Rule to employers even within the entertainment industry where the state exercised
a significant role in preserving their "integrity" (i.e., making sure matches
are not fixed, gambling is conducted honestly, and the state is not cheated
of its shares of gaming revenues). 25 5 Thus, states directly control aspects
of gaming industries to ensure their integrity while state and local governments act more circumspectly vis-a-vis charter schools by specifying desired educational services and operations through contractual agreements. 256 In the Kipp Academy case, the employer Kipp School itself
pointed out that, unlike the racetracks discussed in the Racing Rule, the
School does not generate any revenue for the New York Department of

251. Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 465 (2012); Brief for Lusher Charter
School as Amicus Curiae at 12, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb.
4, 2019); Brief for National Education Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 15-19, Kipp Acad. Charter
Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019); Brief for National Heritage Academies,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb.
4, 2019).
252. See Declination of Assertion of Jurisdiction, 38 Fed. Reg. 9537, 9537 (Apr. 17, 1973).
253. Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 17 (2016).
254. Hyde Leadership Charter Sch. - Brooklyn, 623 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 8 (2016).
255. See Volusia Jai Ala, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280, 1280-81 (1975) (fronton with pari-mutual
gambling); see also Major League Rodeo, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 (1979) (professional rodeo
circuit). Further, even before issuing the Racing Rule, the Board declined to extend its caselaw declining jurisdiction over the horseracing to gambling casinos or major league baseball. See El Dorado

Club, 151 N.L.R.B. 579, 579 (1965); Am. League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 194
(1969).
256. As noted above, the Racing Rule also relies on racetracks relying on a "pattern of shortterm employment" which both minimizes the potential effect on interstate commerce and hinders the
Board's ability to administer the Act in regard to the horseracing and dog-racing industries. Declination of Assertion of Jurisdiction, 38 Fed. Reg. at 9537. This observation seems dubious as the Board
routinely conducts elections and adjudicates unfair labor practices in workplaces that are highly sea-

sonal and utilizes employees on a short-term basis. See Seneca Foods Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 1119, 1119
n.2-3 (1980) (pattern of regular seasonal employment indicates sufficient community of interest for

inclusion in election unit with permanent employees); Baumer Foods, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 690, 690
(1971) (employees with reasonable expectation of seasonal employment should be included in election unit).
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Education and its employees all have stable long-term employment with
the school. 257
The Board's decision in Temple University does not support declining jurisdiction Section 14(c)(1) because the Board only declined jurisdiction over the university as an individual employer rather than exempting it as part of an entire class or category. 258 But, insofar as the Board's
reasoning in that case could be "scaled up" to apply to charter schools as
a class, it is inapposite because the State of Pennsylvania engaged in a
closer and more direct role in Temple University's financial affairs and its
physical operations. In Pennsylvania Virtual, the Board distinguished the
facts of Temple University, noting that the state had designated the university as its "instrumentality" and as a "[s]tate-related university," with
substantial involvement in its financial affairs (including holding title to
the university's facilities) and wielding appointment power over one-third
of the seats on its board of trustees. 25 9 The state also retained the title to
the university's facilities after directly spending funds to upgrade them. 2 60
Generally state and local governments do not directly influence charter
school operations in the manner that the State of Pennsylvania did over
Temple's operations. 26 1 Insofar as the state and local governments directly regulate charter schools (as opposed to merely monitoring their contracts with them), their actions resemble the routine regulation and oversight imposed on private schools by state and local governments, which
does not prevent the Board from asserting jurisdiction over them.2 62
The "special relationship" rationale is generally based on charter
schools' role in fulfilling the governmental responsibility to provide K-12
education. 263 Further, charter schools resemble public schools: they are
tuition-free and open to all children; are obligated to comply with state
statutes and regulations involving academics, teacher standards, student
attendance, and health and safety requirements; and provide some of the
same rights and benefits to their employees that are provided to public

257. Employer's Brief on Review at 15, Kipp Acad. CharterSch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL
656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
258. Temple Univ., 19 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1972) (asserting jurisdiction over Temple would
not effectuate the policies of the NLRA).

259. Pa. virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 10 n.29 (2016) (relying without
attribution on Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 465 (2012)).
260. Temple Univ., 194 N.L.R.B. at 1160.
261. See id.
262. See generally U.S. DEP'T EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009), (compendium of state regulations and oversight of private schools); The Windsor Sch., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B.

991, 991 (1972); Shattuck Sch., 189 N.L.R.B. 886, 887 (1971).
263. See Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, 464-65 (2012).
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school employees. 2 64 In the Kipp Academy case, several amici put forward additional bases supporting the "special relationship" rationale, such
as the local government's role in funding and directing charter schools'
provision of educational services; 265 the need to defer to the state's encouragement of experiments in public education; 2 66 and the evidence of a
2 67
"substantial nexus" between charter schools and local government.
Undercutting the special relationship rationale is that the Board has long
asserted jurisdiction over government contractors and private entities that
produce goods or supplies services under contract for a public subdivision.268 As noted earlier, the Board in National TransportationService
abandoned the "intimate connection" test where it would determine
whether to assert jurisdiction based on whether the government contractor's services served a crucial or core governmental function. 269 Further,
the Board routinely asserts jurisdiction over employers that are both heavily regulated by and deeply entwined with government entities, including
not only government contractors, but private entities involved in national
270
security matters and private schools and universities.
Although the Board temporized in declining to explicitly label charter schools as government contractors, 271 they do operate as government
contractors in their form and function. First, charter schools structure
themselves as private entities when private individuals and organizations
create and operate them. 272 As for their function, charter schools enter
into agreements with state or local governmental entities to educate local
children in exchange for a per-student payment, with the governmental
264. See id at 467.
265. Brief for Lusher Charter School as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No.
02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
266. Brief for Ready Colorado as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
267. See Scaggs v. N.Y. Dept. of Educ., No. 06-Cv-0799, 2007 WL 1456221, at *12-13
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (describing substantial nexus in finding charter schools to be state actors
under 1983 claims).
268.

Brief for National Heritage Academies, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 5, 11, Kipp Acad. Charter

Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
269. See Nat'l Transp. Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (1979).
270.

See Brief for National Heritage Academies, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Kipp Acad. Char-

ter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019) (citing Firstline Transp. Security, Inc.,
347 N.L.R.B. 447, 453 (2006) (national security)); The Windsor Sch., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 991, 991
(1972) (private school); Shattuck Sch., 189 N.L.R.B. 886, 886 (1971) (private school); Trustees of
Columbia University, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 2 (2016) (private university).
271. See Pa. virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 10 (2016) ("Furthermore,
even though charter schools may be subject to state and local regulatory oversight, we find that in
many, if not most respects, charter school cases are not much different from other Board cases involving government contractors.").

272. See id at 6.
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bodies both regulating and overseeing the school's operations. 2 73 But,
even apart from charter schools' status as government contractors, assessing the nature of a charter school's services would be difficult. As
evidenced by charter school statutes, state governments proffer various
reasons for relying on charter schools to provide educational services,
ranging from cost efficiency to encouraging educational experiments. 274
These justifications could just as easily support the school's exempt status
as the Fifth Circuit recognized in Voices for InternationalBusiness and
Education, Inc. v. NLRB, stating that: "One of the perceived virtues, if not
the virtue, of charter schools is that a lack of political oversight gives them
freedom to experiment." 275 The court found this purpose-and its relationship to political accountability-supported (rather than undermined)
the Board's finding that the charter was not an exempt political subdivision under the Hawkins County test. 276
Regarding charter school's putative status as "local activity," Member Miscimarra argued that "[they] are an integral component of the K-12
system of public education, in that they are tuition-free, open to all children, are funded on a per-student basis, and state/local authorities regulate
and oversee them." 277 Indeed, in cases arising in New Orleans where
ninety percent of the public schools are charter schools, Member Miscimarra asserted that charter schools must be local in nature because they
constitute almost all of public education. 278 This Article contends that
even extensive state regulation of charter schools does not establish them
as public in character. After all, states also heavily regulate private
273. See id.
274. Compare W. VA. CODE § 18-5-G1 (2019) (lists stated purposes for authorizing charter
schools including: "(1) Improve student learning by creating more diverse public schools with high
standards for student performance; (2) Allow innovative educational methods, practices and programs
that engage students in the learning process, thus resulting in higher student achievement; (3) Enable
schools to establish a distinctive school curriculum, a specialized academic or technical theme, or
method of instruction; (4) Provide expanded opportunities within the public schools for parents to
choose among the school curricula, specialized academic or technical themes, and methods of instruction that best serve the interests or needs of their child; (5) Provide students, parents, community
members, and local entities with expanded opportunities for involvement in the public school system;
(6) Allow authorized public schools and programs within public schools exceptional levels of selfdirection and flexibility in exchange for exceptional levels of results-driven accountability for student
learning; and (7) Encourage the replication of successful strategies for improving student learning."),

with N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2850, and 24 PA. STAT. § 17-1702-A (showing a similar list of objectives).
275. Voices for Int'l Bus. & Educ. v. NLRB, 905 F.3d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 2018).
276. See id.
277.

Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., slip op. at 13; see Brief for Lusher Charter School as Amicus

Curiae at 13-14, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
278. Better Choice Found., No. 15-RC-197643, 2017 WL3616483 (Aug. 22, 2017); Advocs. for
Arts-Based Educ. Corp., No. 15-RC-174745, 2017 WL 971632 (Jan. 31, 2017); Voices for Int'l Bus.
& Educ., 905 F.3d at 772.
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schools over such issues as teacher accreditation, subjects taught, length
of school day and school year, and health and safety issues, but, nonethe2 79
Furless, the Board has long asserted jurisdiction over private schools.
busithe
level,
a
local
on
occurs
pupils
of
education
actual
the
while
ther,
280
A
ness operations of charter schools often occur on an interstate basis.
2017 report by a Stanford University research center identified the existence of at least eight "super networks" -including the KIPP network that
includes the Kipp Academy Charter School-that can consist of multiple
charter networks (operating dozens of schools) spanning large physical
areas and multiple states. 2 81 The existence of so many super networks
controlling multiple charter schools belies the assertion that charter
schools as a class are local in nature and that their labor disputes would
have primarily localized effects. In addition, the Board routinely asserts
jurisdiction over non-retail employers operating solely within an individual state based on either the direct inflow standard or the indirect inflow/outflow standard.2 82 Finally, while charter schools primarily rely on
state and local funding, the United States Department of Education's
Charter Schools Program (CSP) provides money to charter schools, both
directly and indirectly. 283 In 1967, the Board in Butte Medical reversed

279.

STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 262; The Windsor Sch., Inc., 200

N.L.R.B. 991, 991 (1972).
280.

See CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 2017, CTR FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES

73 (2017), https://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/CMO%20FINAL.pdf.
281. Id. (stating that one of the amici in the Kipp Charter Academy case, National Heritage Association, operates 90 charter schools in 9 states).
282. The direct inflow standard requires that an employer receives a set level of goods and services from out-of-state entities. The indirect inflow/outflow standard requires that the employer
providing goods or services to entities within the same state that would in themselves meet the Board's
jurisdictional standards (other than on an indirect inflow/outflow basis). See NLRB, AN OUTLINE OF
LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES, § 1-201 (2017), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/OutlineofLawandProcedureinRepresenta-

tionCases_2017Update.pdf.
283. The United States Department of Education's website provides the following description of
the CharterSchools Program:
The Charter Schools Program provides money to create new high-quality public charter
schools, as well as to disseminate information about ones with a proven track record. Federal funds are also available to replicate and expand successful schools; help charter
schools find suitable facilities; reward high-quality charter schools that form exemplary
collaborations with the non-chartered public-school sector; and invest in national activities
and initiatives that support charter schools. Collectively we expect these efforts to increase
public understanding of what charter schools can contribute to American education.
Charter School Program (CSP) Grant Competitions, OFF. OF INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT,
(last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/about-cs-competitions.html

The 2018-2019 budget allocated $ 440 million to CSP and President Trump had requested $500 million for this program in his 2020-2021 budget. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
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its prior posture of declining jurisdiction over private hospitals, in part,
because of the interstate flow of monies to and from national medical insurance companies as well as from the Federal government through the
Medicare program (passed only two years earlier). 284 A similar interstate
flow involving multi-state "super networks" as well as the infusion of federal monies supports asserting jurisdiction over charter schools. 285
The final rationale in the putative "standard" for declining jurisdiction under Section 14(c)(1) is that the Board's inconsistent application of
the Hawkins County test over individual charter schools undermines the
NLRA's goal of creating "labor stability" through the application of a
"single, uniform national rule."2 86 Specifically, that the Hawkins County
test requires too many fact-specific variables (state and local laws, the circumstances of a school's creation, and its governing charter and by-laws)
that cause "substantial uncertainty and long-lasting instability" in the
Board's case law regarding charter schools. 2 87 Another argument is that
the Board's partisan political make-up creates policy oscillations and that
permitting the states to apply their own labor relations law would be more
likely to impart stability in this area.288
Further undermining the labor stability rationale is that the actual
course of the Board's application of the Hawkins County test to charter
schools has not created a jurisdictional patchwork. 289 While the Board
has only decided cases in sixteen percent of the extant charter school

EDUCATION FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET SUMMARY 11 (2019) https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget20/summary/20summary.pdf. One advocacy group estimates that, over its 25year history, CSP has provided some $4 billion in funds to charters schools, with approximately 40%
of all charter schools in this country receiving funds from this program. CAROL BURRIS & JEFF
BRYANT, NETWORK FOR PUB. EDUC., ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL: HOW THE FEDERAL CHARTER
SCHOOLS PROGRAM RECKLESSLY TAKES TAXPAYERS AND STUDENTS FOR A RIDE 9 (2019)
https://networkforpubliceducation.org/asleepatthewheel-2/.

284. Butte Med. Props., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967).
285. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 283, at 9; see also CTR FOR RES. ON EDUC.
OUTCOMES, supra note 281, at 3 (defining what exactly a "super network" is and how they tend to
operate as national management organizations for charter schools).

286.

See Pa. virtual Charter Sch., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 15 (2016) (Member Misci-

marra dissenting).
287. See id. at 12, 15 (former Member Miscimarra also contended that the "variegated laws of
the several states" concerning charter schools would make it impossible for their managers and employees to predict whether state or federal labor law will govern their relationship).

288. Brief of Ready Colorado as Amicus Curiae at 19, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019); see Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019
WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019); see Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., slip op. at 18. (Miscimarra dissent contends
that the NLRB should defer to state and local governmental regulation of charter school labor relations
would afford "much greater certainty and predictability.").

289. See Brief of Ready Colorado as Amicus Curiae at 15, Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
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states, it has almost always asserted jurisdiction over charter schools and,
in doing so, it is difficult to discern inconsistency in the Board's application of the test.290 The Board has asserted jurisdiction over charter schools
in six states (Arizona, California, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania) and found a charter school to be an exempt political subdivision
in another state (Texas). 29 1 So far, then, the Board's application of the
test has not resulted in great variation even in results, much less in its
reasoning.292
Contrary to these arguments in favor of abjuring NLRB jurisdiction,
the legislative intent behind the NLRA has been that the Board's application of a uniform national policy would enhance stability in labor relations. 293 If the Board were to decline jurisdiction over all charter schools
and allow their regulation by state labor law, it would leave charter
schools subject to a true "jurisdictional patchwork" of differing state regulation of labor relations. 2 94 Indeed, individual states asserting jurisdiction would have to determine whether to treat charter school employees
either as private-sector or public-sector employees which would leave any
jurisdictional patchwork even more variegated.
In sum, Section 14(c)(1) offers a possible approach to developing a
standard for declining jurisdiction, based on weighing factors and circumstances-the presence of entwinement, a special relationship, local status,
and connection to the national scheme of labor relations-that concern the
relationship between state/local governments and charter schools. 295 But,
in prior precedent relating to other industries, the Board has rejected applying Section 14(c)(1) in this manner and foreclosed creating a standard
in determining jurisdiction over hybrid public-private entities. 296 Thus,
the current NLRB approach of sole reliance on the Hawkins County test
290. See, e.g., Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., slip op. at 11 (emphasizing that the Board often can
assert jurisdiction over charter schools).
291. See supra, text accompanying notes 128-143.
292. Interestingly, one law review article argues that the Board has not been sufficiently flexible
in applying the Hawkins County test and has therefore established a de facto bright-line rule in as-

serting jurisdiction over all charter schools. Amelia A. DeGory, The JurisdictionalDifficulties ofDefining Charter-School Teachers Unions under CurrentLabor Law, 66 DUKE L. J. 379, 413, 415

(2016).
293. See Loc. 926, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 68081(1983).
294. See Butte Med. Props., 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967) (Board asserting jurisdiction over
private hospitals, in part, because almost all states lacked laws regulating collective bargaining in this
sector).

295.

See Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019) (Mem-

ber McFerran, dissenting).

296.

See, e.g., Am. League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 192 (basing much of its

decision to assert jurisdiction on the "national scope" of the baseball industry).
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to determine jurisdiction over charter schools is not only the best approach, but the only viable options given the NLRB's past policy decisions.
In rejecting utilizing Section 14(c)(1) to exempt charter schools from
Board jurisdiction, this Article does not advocate treating it as a dead letter
or nullity. As discussed in this Article, the Board has no need of using
Section 14(c)(1) to decline jurisdiction over classes of private entities.
linked to public entities because Board precedent has comprehensively
delineated private employers from public subdivisions under Section 2(2)
of the NLRA. That is, the Board in its caselaw has filled in the gaps in
defining public subdivision, thus obviating the need for the Board to exercise discretion (and create a standard) to determine jurisdiction in applying Section 2(2).297 Nonetheless, the Board should not abandon Section 14(c)(1) altogether because it may wish to exercise discretionary
declination of jurisdiction over new industries based on their local character despite ostensibly qualifying for Board jurisdiction under its inflow/outflow standard.
For example, the Board has not determined whether to assert jurisdiction over the medical marijuana industry. 29 8 The individual entities in
this industry, such as dispensaries and greenhouses, may meet the Board's
jurisdictional characteristics based on their purchases of equipment and
supplies on an interstate basis, but also possess other characteristics (i.e.,
heavy state regulation, the absence of interstate sales of cannabis products
due to state law and federal policy) indicating a local character. 299 The
Board could conceivably wish to utilize the discretion provided in Section
14(c)(1) to utilize a standard in assessing a broader array of characteristics
in this industry in order to determine whether to assert or decline jurisdiction on an industry-wide basis based on its local character. 300
297. See Hawkins County, 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 691-92 (1967).
298. See, e.g., NLRB Advice Memorandum on Agri-Kind (Oct. 21, 2020) (refusing to consider
the question of whether to assert jurisdiction over a marijuana enterprise).
299. See, e.g., NLRB Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Couns., on

Northeast Patients Group, to Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg'l Dir. 8-9 (Oct. 25, 2013) (discussing the
Boards past assertion of jurisdiction over industries with particularly heavy state regulation); see also
Taylor G. Sachs, Note, The Wellness Approach: Weeding Out UnfairLabor Practicesin the Cannabis
Industry, 43 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 287, 300 (2015).
300. In an advice memorandum, the NLRB General Counsel's Division of Advice concluded
that the Board should assert jurisdiction over business enterprises within the medical marijuana industry if they otherwise meet the Board's monetary jurisdictional standards. Barry J. Kearney, Assoc.
Gen. Couns., supra note 299 at 1, 5-9. In discussing Sec. 14(c)(1), the Division of Advice noted that
the Board had either reversed or substantially narrowed its "historical declinations." Id. at 7. In
advocating asserting jurisdiction, the Division of Advice found that: the dispensary at issue purchases
out-of-state supplies; there are thousands employed in the medical marijuana (some of whom are
represented by labor unions); and that labor disputes could affect out-of-state suppliers and other
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CONCLUSION
By its course of action in Kipp Academy, the Board opted to continue
to apply the Hawkins County test to individual charter schools and-at
least for the present-determined not to utilize Section 14(c)(1) to decline
jurisdiction over charter schools as a class. 30 1 This Article finds this approach to be correct as the Hawkins County test provides an efficient rule
that permits the Board to determine the public or private status of a charter
by examining the relatively narrow circumstances of its creation and the
extent of its accountability to political actors. This efficiency has made it
unnecessary for the Board to invoke Section 14(c)(1) in order to apply a
standard-like approach permitting it to consider a wider array of circumstances and factors in determining whether to assert or decline jurisdiction
over charter schools as an industry. 302 Perhaps most importantly, over the
course of time, the Board has chosen policy paths making it impossible to
create a standard under Section 14(c)(1) permitting it to decline jurisdiction over charter schools as an industry. 303 Nonetheless, Section 14(c)(1)
still provides a useful option to the NLRB if it should require a broader
analysis as to whether to assert or decline jurisdiction over a particular
industry.

aspects of interstate commerce. Further, labor unrest in the industry could interfere with federal efforts ofprevent diversion of cannabis to states that prohibit its sale. See NLRB Advice Memorandum
from Barry J. Keamey, Assoc. Gen. Cours. on High Level Health, to Kelly Selvidge, Acting Reg'l
Dir. (Jul. 31, 2015) (two employees in cannabis grow room exempt from NLRA as agricultural employees). This Article does not advocate asserting or denying jurisdiction under Sec. 14(c)(1), but
merely notes that the Board may wish to retain the discretion to make its jurisdictional decisions under
a broader consideration of relevant factors. See Sachs, supra note 299 at 294, 302-5 (assertion of

jurisdiction would be consistent with prior precedent and NLRA policy).
301. See Kipp Acad. Charter Sch., No. 02-RD-191760, 2019 WL 656300 (Feb. 4, 2019).
302. See supra Section Il.C.4.
303. See supra Section ILC.4.
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